Constitutional Hill

March, 2010:

On freedom of assembly

Mar 18th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
19 comments

One could say all is well that ends well. But news that the Presidency has distanced itself from an earlier missive which purported to ban all protests around the Union Buildings still leaves one with a worry about the Presidency’s commitment to free speech and concerns that it has an eccentric view about its own power.

The Presidency’s move comes in the wake of an urgent court challenge by Equal Education (EE) in the North Gauteng High Court. Equal Eduaction was upset because in a letter dated 24 November 2009, Mr Dumisani Mahlasela, Head: Public Participation and Public Relations, The Presidency, stated: “Mr Vusi Mavimbela, Director-General in The Presidency, has directed that all marches to the Union Buildings and the Presidency be suspended until further notice.”

There have been two responses from the Presidency: Firstly, The Presidency has issued a media statement saying: “The Presidency wishes to place on record that it has not instituted any ban on marches to the Union Buildings.” But this statement directly contradicts the letter of Mr Mahlasela referred to above. 

After the Court challenge The Presidency wrote a letter to EE saying: “I am happy to inform you that The Presidency has no objection to your march scheduled for March 26 at the Lawns.” (The ‘Lawns’ refers to the gardens below the Union Buildings.)

It appears that the Presidency has misconstrued its power in this regard, first denied the existence of a letter which shows that it did and then, when it was caught out, retracted. Better late than never, I guess. If one looks at the relevant legislation it is clear that the Presidency does not have the power to ban all marches to the Union Bulding.

The Regulations of gatherings Act of 1993, passed by the apartheid parliament, deals with protests at the Union Buildings. Section 7(1) states that  all demonstrations and gatherings are prohibited in certain areas of the Union Buildings immediately around the office of the President (but this does not include the lawns of the Union Buildings).

In other words, while demonstrations immediately around the Union Buildings are generally banned, demonstrations on the Lawns are not banned and must be dealt with by the relevant authorities.

However – and this is important – section  7(2) of that same Act states that the ban on demonstrations in the immediate vicinity of the Union Building is not absolute. One may apply to the Director-General: Office of the State President, who can grant permission for such a gathering.

The Act does not state when permission may be granted and when not. The Act was passed before the advent of the Constitution so its unclear whether this provisions is Constitutional as it may unjustifiably infringe on the right to freedom of assembly guaranteed in section 17 of the Constitution.

If it is Constitutional, it will have to be applied by the DG to conform to the Constitution and the DG will have to take into account the right of freedom of assembly when making a decision to grant permission for a gathering or not. This means that a blanket ban on all gatherings at all times at the Union Buildings – even hose in the vicinity of the President’s office – will probably be unconstitutional. Even in that limited sense the Presidency misconstrued its powers in this regard.

The DG will only be able to deny permission to gather when he or she has good reason to do so (for example, when he fears that the working of the government will be threatened or that violence will ensue if permission is granted for a gathering).

The fact that the Presidency wrote a letter in which it purported to ban all gatherings around the Union Buildings while it had no legal authority to do so, is worrying. In a country based on the Rule of Law the Presidency has a special duty to act in terms of the law and not to Act as if it is a law unto itself. Writing letters purporting to ban all demonstrations around the Union Buildings when it has no legal authority to do so, suggests the Presidency is not too familiar with these basic tenets of the Rule of Law.

It is to be welcomed that when it was challenged the Presidency immediately realized that it had acted outside the scope of its powers when it purported to ban all gatherings around the Union Buildings. The Union Buildings holds a symbolic place in our political landscape and the right to freedom of expression and the right to gather must surely include the right to demonstrate outside the Union Buildings – as long as the correct legal steps have been taken.

One does not want to see the chaos that erupted last year when soldiers marched to the Union Buildings, but the Gatherings Act allows for such contingencies and the relevant authorities – not the Presidency – may well refuse to grant permission for a demonstration if there are valid fears that violence might ensue. The last time I checked Equal Education is quite a peaceful organization, so their demonstration could not possibly be said to fall within this category.

Why Malema’s hate speech judgment is wrong

Mar 16th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
91 comments

The judgment of magistrate CJ Collis in which she found Julius Malema guilty of hate speech and harassment will probably be cheered on by many South Africans who are sick and tired of the hateful and idiotic utterances of the leader of the ANC Youth League. “Finally old Julius got his come-uppance,” many of us might say. “Finally our legal system has shown Julius a big fat middle finger!”

The problem is, from a legal perspective it is difficult not to conclude that the judgment is wrong. In my opinion it may very well be overturned on appeal. By saying this I am not agreeing with Tim Cohen in Business Day who warned that the judgment implies that one may not say anything rude about anyone. Cohen wrote:

Yet the court seemed to attach little significance to the notion of freedom of speech, and elevated his comments to “hateful” even when Malema was transparently motivated not by hate but by disbelief — a disbelief actually endorsed by the court’s finding. In a sense, this finding is in the same category as the charge against University of Cape Town student Chumani Maxwele, who “waved” at President Jacob Zuma ’s blaring cavalcade. Police ministry spokesman Zweli Mnisi reportedly said that “no person is permitted to use foul language, swear at another individual, as such conduct may lead to promoting hate”.

It is clear from the relevant provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) that Cohen’s fears are misguided. Hate speech is defined in the Act as words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, (in other words, words based on race, sex, gender or sexual orientation, say) against any person that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful; be harmful or to incite harm; or promote or propagate hatred. Showing the middle finger to the President could never be construed as words based on any of the prohibited grounds such as race, sex, gender and sexual orientation, so it could never be construed as hate speech.

Many people fail to understand that hate speech as defined in PEPUDA requires more than making hurtful or harmful statements about someone. If I say the President is a sex obsessed idiot, or that Helen Zille is a racist madam, it might be rude and it might even be defamatory but it would not constitute hate speech as I would not be saying anything based on Zuma or Zille’s race, sex or sexual orientation.

Having said that, it seems pretty clear to me that the magistrate dropped the ball and applied this provision on hate speech incorrectly when she found him guilty. Remember, Julius Malema had said:

When a woman didn’t enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a nice time will wait until the sun comes out, request breakfast and taxi money. In the morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money. You don’t ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you.

As the expert witnesses pointed out, such utterances were gender insensitive and trivialised rape. It perpetuated male sexual entitlement and was obviously sexist and would have upset many South Africans – including the survivors of rape. Based on this expert opinion above (with which I agree) Magistrate Collis found that “given the totality of the evidence” the court was satisfied that the words “could reasonably be construed as hurtful, harmful and demeaning to women” and hence constituted hate speech.

The problem is that the definition of hate speech states that words will only constitute hate speech when they can “reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention” to be hurtful or harmful to woman, or black South Africans or gays and lesbians. Given the modest educational achievements of the respondent, his sexist world view and the context in which the words were uttered (at an election rally where Julius was defending Jacob Zuma) it is far from clear that his words could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to cause harm to women in general.

Even if the words could be so construed, the magistrate erred by failing to make a finding on this crucial point. She thus never made a finding on whether, objectively determined, Julius could be reasonably suspected of having the intention to harm women in general. By failing to focus on the intention of the respondent, the magistrate did not apply the test for hate speech correctly.

She also found Julius guilty of harassment, which is defined in PEPUDA as “unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or creates a hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce submission by actual or threatened adverse consequences and which is related to gender or sexual orientation; or a person’s membership or presumed membership of a group identified by one or more of the prohibited grounds or a characteristic associated with such group.”

This provision obviously applies to the conduct of one person against another. What is required is an identifiable victim. One must be behaving in a persistent or serious manner towards another because of their sex or sexual orientation and there must be consequences for the victim before one could be found guilty of harassment. Magistrate Collis found that because the words demeaned and humiliated women in general the utterances constituted harassment. This is obviously wrong as it fails to identify specific victims of the harassment as intended by the Act.

Saying this does not mean that I do not think what Julius said was despicable and that his words perpetuate harmful myths about rape. I am merely saying that perpetuating harmful myths about rape in and of itself does not constitute hate speech as defined in PEPUDA. Similarly, while perpetuating harmful and incorrect myths about black people – by saying black people are intellectually inferior, say, or are predisposed towards corruption – would be despicable and worthy of censure by all right thinking South Africans, it would probably not constitute hate speech.

That is why the judgment is probably wrong. Brace yourself for the gloating when it is overturned on appeal.

Don’t blame the Constitution

Mar 15th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
70 comments

Winnie Madikizela-Mandela has denied giving an interview in which she criticised Nelson Mandela because “he negotiated a poor deal for Black people” (although she has not denied saying these words – just that she did not say them during an interview). Over at Politicsweb, Musa Xulu is perplexed that this statement has caused so much controversy. According to him the negotiated compromise which produced our 1996 Constitution sold out black people – just like Winnie  is reported to have said.

The indigenous people’s rights to land, mineral resources and everything else that was stolen from our forefathers back in 1652 when Jan Van Reebieck first sailed into our shores were trampled upon in the process. When the founding father of the ANC, one Themba Pixley kaIsaka Seme pooled all tribes together in 1912 under the slogan “MSotho, MZulu, MXhosa hlanganani” he had the complete economic emancipation of Black people in mind.

He certainly did not intend for the half hearted compromise that was achieved in Kempton Park. Under the stewardship of Chief Albert Luthuli, the ANC led a campaign called the Congress of the People through which the Freedom Charter was written in 1955.

Mr Xulu is of course correct that in the process of colonisation, black people were dispossessed of much of the land. He is also correct that much of the economic wealth in post-apartheid South Africa remains in the hands of whites (as well as, one could add, in the hands of a few well-connected black tenderpreneurs and Kebbilists). He is also correct that this is not fair as it perpetuates injustices of colonialism and apartheid.

But the question is whether our constitutional compromise should be blamed for this state of affairs. I think not. In fact, blaming the constitutional compromise is lazy and unhelpful. It might be politically beneficial to says such populist things, but it might expose one as a rather thoughtless and uninformed person. Worse, it might make people wonder about your commitment to democracy and may lead people to conclude that one supports a kind of African fascism.

First, the 1996 Constitution establishes a multi-party democratic system of government and guarantees regular elections in which all adult South Africans can vote for the party of their choice. It invests the indirectly elected President with enormous powers to appoint the heads of the security services, the NPA and the judiciary. It creates a new Constitutional Court whose members are in effect appointed by the President. In short, the “half hearted compromise” endorses the power of the majority through the creation of a powerful Parliament and Presidency who has a decisive say in the appointment of key state actors.

Unless Mr Xulu and Winnie are not real democrats, they can therefore not complain about nature of the constitutional democracy negotiated for South Africa. 

This means that they must be upset because they believe some provisions in the Constitution hampers the economic and social transformation of the country. Sadly they do not refer to the specific provisions of the Constitution they believe to be objectionable, so one is unclear whether they actually have a clue of what they are talking about or whether they are merely saying things without thinking because they want to score a few cheap points.

Well, if one wants to be generous one could try and conjure up the arguments they would have made had they been informed and had they had any knowledge of the Constitution. First they might have said that a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights hampers the achievement of justice because such a document contains an equality clause which prohibits the state from taking aggressive corrective measures to rectify the effects of past injustice. Anyone who has read section 9(2) of the Constitution (and that provision’s interpretation by the Constitutional Court) would know that this is nonsense. As our Constitution endorses substantive equality an equality clause assists, rather than hampers the achievement of social and economic transformation.

Second, they might be referring to section 25 of the Constitution, which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property, requires that compensation be paid when property is expropriated and gives individuals or communities who have been dispossessed of their property since 1913 the right to restitution of that property or to equivalent compensation.

Because all white individuals who are deprived of property must be compensated and because the market value of the property is one of the factors (but not the only one) to be taken into account when deciding on the compensation, this section could perhaps be said to hamper the process of correcting for the past injustices. A new government cannot steal the property from white settlers – even when that property was stolen from local inhabitants 100 or more years ago.

However, if one looks at the results of land reform and considers South Africa’s precarious position in the global economy, this line of reasoning would, however be difficult to sustain. We know that most farms that have been expropriated and returned to its original owners are not productive. We know this (and we know this statement is not the  racist ranting of disaffected whites)  because the Minister of Land Affairs has told us so. This is not surprising. If one takes land from people who have the skills and the knowledge to run successful agribusinesses and one gives it to people who were never given the opportunity to develop the skills necessary to make a success of a large scale agribusiness, chances are that food production on those farms will decline.

If all the land stolen from black South Africans were handed back without a massive, highly effective, skills transfer programme, food production would collapse and many South Africans (mostly poor and black) would starve. We know such a programme is not presently in place, despite the relatively modest scope of land redistribution efforts, so chances that it will be in place if large scale redistribution were to be undertaken are zero percent.  As skills transfers would have to conducted by the very people whose land were repossessed without compensation, it is rather unlikely that they would be eager to take part in such a programme. By preventing the large scale transfer of white-owned agricultural land to black South Africans, it could be argued that section 25 of the Constitution protects the interests of all South Africans – even if it unfortunately leaves much of the productive farm land in the hands of white farmers.

This might not be emotionally pleasing and it might fly in the face of our sense of justice, but it is the reality any government in South Africa has to live with.

Section 25 constructs a careful regime of land reform, coupled with the right to redistribute white owned land after payment of fair compensation. In any case, there is no evidence that in its absence, the government would have proceeded with large scale redistribution of white owned land. This is because the government is scared out of its wits of foreign investors and South Africa’s image amongst those investors, so they are not likely to do anything that would scare away those investors. Even if this was not the case, large scale redistribution of land would have required a relatively efficient Department to drive the process. As the department would not even be able to organise a beer fest in a brewery, the current Department would not be able to drive a large scale land reform programme.

Granted, there is much wrong with the land reform process in South Africa. The willing buyer, willing seller concept (which is not mandated by the Constitution) is not working. The Department seems to be clueless and lacks the political will and the skills to provide the necessary support for emerging black farmers. Questions about nepotism and incompetence are often asked. This is not the fault of the Constitution but the government of the day and of the officials who are not doing their jobs.

It is easy to blame the constitutional settlement for everything that remains wrong in South Africa. Easy, but also wrong.

On hate speech and a phone call from prison

Mar 11th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
82 comments

I have new respect for ANC spokesperson, Jackson Mthembu, who was arrested on Thursday morning around 7 am for drunken driving in Cape Town but apparently gave a 21-minute telephonic interview to the South African Press Association (SAPA) - while in police custody – 90 minutes later. Now that is what I call a work ethic worth emulating.

During the interview Mr Mthembu passionately defended ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema for singing “shoot the boers, they are rapists” - before bursting into song himself. At this stage it is unclear whether Mthembu was really drunk at 7 in the morning and if he was, whether he had been partying the whole night or had started drinking very early in the morning.

Although I cannot claim that I have never been drunk at 7 am in the morning, I can confirm that I have never been arrested for drunken driving and I have definitely never given a media interview from a prison cell while allegedly under the influence of liquor. Respect bru!

Sadly, the said interview was not his best work as ANC spokesperson. Whether he slipped up because he was drunk or because he was in prison and did not have the Internet handy, is unclear. Malema obviously attacked Zille (she is apparently a Satanist) and De Lille (she is apparently not a fit wife) and sang the “kill a boer” song to detract attention from the fact that Julius has not been paying his taxes and has been lying about his business interests.

The media fell for this ploy hook, line and sinker. Malema is a genius at manipulating the media – a bit like Hitler, but without the mustache and without the scary uniforms and the homoerotic military parades. (Relax, I am not saying Malema is as evil as Hitler – just that he is very good at getting the media to play to his tune.)

Back to Mthembu, who explained to SAPA (while he was either sober or drunk, but definitely in police custody) that the “kill a boer” song did not constitute hate speech as it was an old struggle song:

This song was sung for many years even before Malema was born … Julius doesn’t even know who’s the writer of the song. He got it from us [the ANC]. You must blame the ANC, don’t blame Julius. But when you blame the ANC, then contextualise it.

The problem is that in 2003 the Human Rights Commission Appeal Committee found that chanting the “kill the boer, kill a farmer” did constitute hate speech. In an opinion written by Prof Karthy Govender, the appeal body, relying on the much narrower definition of hate speech in section 16(2) of the Constitution and not on the more expansive definition in section 10 of the Equality Act, rejected the line of reasoning offered by Mthembu from his prison cell.

The liberation effort, including the armed struggle, was directed against the policy of apartheid and against its supporters. One of the slogans used to mobilize people against Apartheid was ‘’Kill the Boer, Kill the farmer’’. It was a rallying call to resistance, defiance and acts of violence in furtherance of the objectives of defeating apartheid. In effect, it called for the ultimate harm to be visited upon persons deemed to be the enemy. It was a slogan created for a particular time and in a particular context. It reflected the intensity of the race based conflict that was raging in South Africa at the time….

There can be no doubt that the slogan, given its content, its history and the context in which it was chanted, would harm the sense of well being, contribute directly to a feeling of marginalisation, and adversely affect the dignity of Afrikaners. The slogan says to them that they are still the enemy of the majority of the people of this country. It contributes to the alienation of the target community and conveys a particularly divisive message to the majority community that the target community is less deserving of respect and dignity. This generalized slogan is directed against an entire community of people. Words convey meaning and do cause hurt and injury. There is a real likelihood that this slogan causes harm.

As apartheid had ended and the political situation had normalized it was not acceptable anymore to say “kill the boer” and if one does it constitutes hate speech on the basis of race.

I would therefore be surprised if an Equality Court, relying on the far wider definition of hate speech in the Equality Act, does not find Julius guilty of hate speech. Of course, it is not clear that the provision in the Equality Act is constitutional as it infringes on the right to freedom of expression and is far wider than the exclusion carved out by section 16(2) of the Constitution. It may be saved by the limitation clause but I am nots ure it will.

If I was Malema’s lawyer I would challenge the constitutionality of the relevant provision of the Act to try and escape responsibility and to appear to be a champion of the Constitution. That would be brilliant public relations and may even teach the media and ordinary South Africans a thing or two about freedom of expression. 

However, if the Equality Court finds Julius guilty of hate speech it has wide powers to impose the appropriate punishment. It could order Julius to pay an amount of money to Solidarity or the Freedom Front (or maybe to donate his watch to one of these organisations?), or to apologise to white South Africans, or to do community service in Orania.

As for Mr Mthembu, I hope the ANC does not fire him. We all make mistakes, but few of us would show his dedication in getting our message – no matter how misguided – out there. If he was drunk as alleged, he should plead guilty and apologise to the ANC and the nation. Then he could continue to act as spokesperson for the ANC, which would allow all of us to snigger at him and make fun of his dedication to the cause of spin-doctoring. As the add says, that would be priceless.

Great start President Zuma, but there are many more questions to be answered

Mar 10th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
38 comments

It is gratifying to see that Michael Hulley, President Jacob Zuma’s personal lawyer, today announced that the President has finally provided a list to the Secretary of Cabinet “containing any gifts, benefits or financial interests held or received either by him or by any family member, as required in terms of the Executive Ethics Code”. In a statement, Hulley claimed (rather implausibly) that the delay in submitting this list resulted from uncertainty about the nature of the disclosure to be made, as well as the extent to which declarations of family members were required.

In deciding whether to accept or retain any gift, the President has applied the same high ethical standard he otherwise would have in respect of other members of the Executive. In any event, whilst these gestures are highly appreciated and of immense sentimental significance, none of the gifts are of extraordinary monetary value.

The attendant delay in completing this task responsibly has created an opportunity for some to unfairly speculate without substance. The President does not hold any directorship, membership or shareholding in any company, either public or private, nor is he associated in any way therewith.The suggestions to the contrary are devoid of any truth and are regrettable.

As I pointed out before, section 6 of the Code states that like all other Cabinet members, the President must disclose his own financial interests and those of his spouses, permanent companions and dependent children including: shares and other financial interests in companies and other corporate entities; sponsorships and their sources and “other assistance” and its sources;  ”gifts and hospitality” and its sources; “other benefits” and their sources; foreign travel paid by a sponsor and the description of the sponsor; the land and property owned; and the pension owned, its sources and value.

Section 7 of the Code also requires the President to record some financial interests in the secret part of the register. These include: the value of interests in a corporate entity other than a private or public company; the details of foreign travel when the nature of a visit requires those details to be confidential; the details, including the address, of any private residence; the value of any pension; details of the financial interests of a member’s spouse, permanent companion or dependent child; and the member’s liabilities.

One would assume that in order to demonstrate that the President has nothing to hide, the Secretary of Cabinet will immediately make public that part of the declaration that is not deemed secret by the Code. Although there is no legal obligation to do so, one would also assume that given the lingering questions about President Zuma’s financial dealings, he would also volunteer to make public the private aspects of the declaration – at the very least to the extent that it deals with his own finances. Such a gesture may well silence his critics and will allay fears about the extent to which private benefactors have been bankrolling the President and his family.

The public part of the declaration only relates to gifts and benefits given to President Zuma’s since he took office, and would thus not give any indication of the President’s current financial health and the extent to which private benefactors had bankrolled Zuma (if at all) before he took office. It would also not give any indication of the President’s financial liabilities.

The last point is important, as it relates directly to the prosecution and conviction of Schabir Shaik. As I wrote before, the President had told Parliament in 2003 that the more than R1 million he had received from Shaik was a “loan” and therefore need not have been declared. The court found that Zuma would not have been able to repay this “loan” using his salary as Deputy President. Given the fact that Zuma was unemployed for most of the period since the court made this finding, the characterization of this “loan” by Zuma at this stage would be of cardinal importance.

If the President has not listed this amount as a liability, it would mean either that he had paid off the “loan,” or that he now agrees that this was not a loan at all, or that Shaik had forgiven the loan. All three possibilities pose serious questions about the President’s finances.

If he now claims that he had paid off the “loan”, one might well ask who had given Zuma more than R1 million to do so, what the relationship of this benefactor is to Zuma and whether the President has done any favors for this person or whether the person has received any government contracts.

If Shaik had forgiven him the “loan”, then one would have to ask why he had done so and whether the President could now lawfully pardon Shaik. If Shaik had indeed forgiven the “loan”, a question may arise about whether this was done to “buy” a pardon – something that would make a pardon unlawful.

If Zuma now agrees that the money was given as a gift and that it was never a loan at all, he would be conceding that he had defrauded Parliament when he had claimed in 2003 that the money Shaik had given him had indeed been a loan.

It is commendable that in his statement Hulley says that “as Head of State and Government, the President is most mindful of government’s commitment to transparent governance and accountability, to which principles he remains committed in leading government”. These fine sentiments would remain no more than empty words unless the President takes us into his confidence and tells the nation exactly what the state of his financial affairs are.

Moral code? Nah, let’s rather get rich quick and oppress women and gays

Mar 9th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
45 comments

It is, to say the least, rather ironic that President Jacob Zuma has called for a national debate on the “issue of a national moral code” around the same time that it emerged that he himself was flouting the law, that his Minister of Arts and Culture holds hateful views about gay men and lesbians, and that Julius Malema has enriched himself at the expense of the poor and has failed to pay any taxes on his ill-gotten gains.

Now that is what I call chutzpah! Unfortunately, the President’s recent actions and utterances as well as his resolute silence about flagrant unethical behavior by members of his own party and his government, suggest that this chutzpah is born out of ignorance, bigotry and a lack of an own, constitutionally acceptable, ethical compass.

Making the proposal, our President said that using one’s own culture to judge others is unconstitutional. According to Zuma:

Each one of us must be respected. That’s what our Constitution says. No matter how you feel — some of us have very strong feelings about some of the things — we respect the Constitution, no matter how we feel…. We cannot be expected, all the time, to be respectful to others when others are not respectful to us and others.

The President is wrong on so many counts, spectacularly and ignorantly so.

It is nonsense to say that it is unconstitutional to use one’s own culture to judge others. What kind of fascist mind-set is that? The Constitution guarantees for everyone the right to freedom of thought and opinion. In our personal capacities we have a constitutional right to use our own cultural, religious or ethical beliefs to judge others, and we all do – all the time.

If one happens to be a Catholic, say, or an African traditionalist, and holds homophobic and bigoted views about gay men and lesbians, one is free to hold such opinions and to express them – as long as it does not amount to hate speech. If one is a feminist and one happens to believe polygamy is a sexist and patriarchal institution designed by lecherous and immoral old men to enforce the sexual and economic exploitation of women, one is equally free to hold and express such opinions within the limits of the hate speech laws.

For example, we have no constitutional duty to respect the values, beliefs and practices of pedophiles, rapists, murderers, racists, sexists or thieves.

Moreover, the President cannot hide behind the Constitution to avoid criticism of his own beliefs and actions which many people believe to be exploitative and immoral and lacking in honesty and integrity. Of course, depending on one’s own ideological, religious, moral or ethical views one may agree or disagree with this belief, but everyone has a constitutional right to hold and express their views on the moral probity of the President. A moral code that precludes us from either supporting or opposing the President’s private and public statements and actions will directly conflict with the rights in the Constitution and could therefore not be of any use to the President.

In a heterogenous society like ours with its many different cultures and beliefs, it would of course be prudent to strive to understand and respect the beliefs and cultural practices of others in as much as those beliefs and practices do not conflict with the values enshrined in our Constitution. But some beliefs and practices (like the President’s polygamous lifestyle based on sexism and patriarchy or Minister Lulu Xingwana homophobic hatred of black lesbians) would harm others and would perpetrate more hatred and prejudice against women and against gay men and lesbians and it would thus be unethical (but not unconstitutional) to harbor or express such prejudices in a personal capacity.

What our President does not seem to understand is that some beliefs and practices – whether inspired by our cultural and religious views or our own sense of morality - are themselves inimical to a constitutional state based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom and as such we have an ethical duty to reject them. The government of the day also has a constitutional duty to protect people from such practices (although the beliefs on which they are based are usually beyond the reach of censure) through legislation and law reform by passing hate crimes laws and by outlawing cultural and religious practices that subjugate women, say, or endorse societal prejudice against gay men and lesbians.

The President and cabinet members – who have a duty to uphold the Constitution and the law – do not only have an ethical but also a legal obligation to reject such harmful beliefs and practices or at least not to endorse them in public. This is something dear Minister Lulu has failed to grasp. Thus she objected to works of art that portrayed black women in intimate situations because it “stereotyped black women” and refused to open an art exhibition where these works were displayed.

By saying this, the Minister revealed how immoral she herself is and how she has failed to uphold the values enshrined in the Constitution. If she believes that depictions of black women in intimate poses stereotype black women, she must obviously believe that it is a bad thing for black women to be intimate with one another. If she was not a homophobic bigot, she would have celebrated those works of art as affirming the life experiences, with all its complexities, of black lesbians. Instead, she revealed just how immoral she was by endorsing hatred and prejudice against black lesbians, the very attitudes which have led to the murdering of many black lesbians in South Africa over the past few years.

President Jacob Zuma’s moral code is a non-starter if it does not take the Constitution as its starting point. But as Zuma is not a great fan of the law or the Constitution – unless he can use it to escape prosecution for bribery and corruption – he has reportedly tapped a religious group headed by soon to be twice divorced Ray McCauly to lead the discussion. Heaven help us. That is like asking Schabir Shaik to lead a discussion on business ethics and anti-corruption measures.

Any discussion about a moral code will have to take as its starting point respect for the human dignity of all. It will have to assume that a shared constitutional morality is based on a REJECTION of cultural beliefs and practices which refuse to respect the human dignity of some members of society because they happen to be gay and lesbian, or because they happen to be women or because they happen to be white or black or colored or Indian or they happen to be poor.

Such a code would also have to embrace respect for values of integrity and honesty and will have to reject a value system which valorizes materialism and the bling culture above all else and endorses breaches of the law or stealing from the poor “because we have not struggled to be poor” or because the theft or criminality is perpetrated by persons of a particular race or political party. Such a code would therefore require a complete rethink of the moral values of a large section of the present leadership of the ANC – including that of the ANC Youth League Leader, the Minister of Arts and Culture and the President himself.

Nah, not going to happen. Let’s rather get rich quick by stealing from the poor and by oppressing gays and women while flouting the law. I am sure our President will support a moral code based on these “sound” values. After all, it would not require any change in behavior from many in the present government leadership.

Jacob Zuma has flouted ethics rules before

Mar 8th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
16 comments

No wonder President Jacob Zuma is flouting the provisions of the Executive Members Act. He has gotten away with this kind of thing before. In 2003 Zuma was in serious trouble after it emerged that he had received millions of Rand from fraudster Schabir Shaik without declaring these benefits as required by the Code of Ethics promulgated in terms of the Executive Members Act.

In 2003, following weeks of correspondence with Zuma, the Ethics Committee of Parliament exonerated Zuma – who was then still the Deputy President and therefore a very powerful man. The Committee had accepted his explanation that the “loans” given to him by Shaik were not free, but bore interest: “As there is no evidence at hand that contradicts the authenticity of the loan agreements, it is recommended that the loan agreements submitted by the Deputy President be accepted as valid and correct,” the committee concluded.

The report tabled on 19 November 2003 said, “In this matter the Deputy President provided documents to the Committee which verified his response that there was no benefit received. It is on this basis that the Committee finds that there is no breach to the code of conduct.”

The problem is that the High Court, in finding that Shaik had paid Zuma a bribe, found that these documents submitted by Zuma to Parliament were concocted by the conspirators in order to hide the fact that the money was a benefit and not a loan.

The Shaik judgment thus provides proof “beyond reasonable doubt” that Zuma had in fact defrauded Parliament (much like Tony Yengeni, who was sentenced to three years imprisonment after his fraud came to light). Zuma, however, was never prosecuted for defrauding Parliament, despite the fact that the “loan agreements” he had submitted to Parliament were found to be fraudulently made.

In the judgment in which Schabir Shaik was convicted of bribing Zuma, the court found that the various “loan agreements” which Zuma had submitted to Parliament was nothing of the sort. As Judge Hillary Squires recounted the evidence, these various agreements were hastily drawn up in anticipation of the Code of Ethics kicking in: As Squires noted:

It is also clear from the evidence of Linda Makathini, the official legal adviser to the Deputy President, that the Executive Code of Ethics Act had been promulgated in October the previous year and the resultant Code was in the process of being drafted and actually came into existence in the following year. To show loans made without interest being payable under that Code, would amount to a benefit which would require a special declaration. If they carried interest, on the other hand, they were regarded as a liability and did not….

One only has to consider the financial position of the Nkobi Group as at the date of signature of this document [the loan agreement] to see how divorced from reality it was as a genuine business proposition….

We thought eventually the State’s contention about these documents was well founded. They are clearly not what they purport to be and were probably drawn up when this sort of information had to be disclosed by Members of Provincial Executive Councils and it would have been a suspicious circumstance if these payments had not been recorded as a loan. The evidence regarding the second such agreement, that is the agreement of loan of 16 May 1999, is hardly any better as a genuine statement of what it purports to be…

But then, even if these could be regarded as loans despite all the evidence to the contrary, the basis on which they were made would, in our view, unarguably amount to a “benefit” within the meaning of the word in the Corruption Act. [The Code also requires Cabinet Ministers to declare "benefits".]

Thus, although Zuma had contended to Parliament that the sums of money he had received from Shaik were loans and hence did not have to be declared, the court found that the money given to Zuma could not have been loans and even if they were, these “loans” were given on such beneficial terms that they would constitute a “benefit” for the purposes of the Corruption Act – let alone the Code of Ethics. Zuma was therefore misleading Parliament when he claimed otherwise. This may very well have constituted fraud for which Zuma may – if he was charged – very well have been convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

When Zuma was fired as Deputy President by President Thabo Mbeki after the Shaik verdict, he also resigned as a member of Parliament despite the fact that Mbeki had made no effort to fire him from Parliament. There was a very good reason for his sudden resignation. If he had remained an MP, the Ethics Committee would have had to re-open the probe against him and would have had to accept the factual finding in the Shaik case that the “evidence” provided by Zuma that the money received from Shaik was a “loan” and not a “benefit” as defined by the Code, was fake.

Zuma would then probably have been found guilty by the Committee of breach of the Code of Ethics and could then also have been charged with fraud. He therefore had no other option but to give up his seat in the National Assembly and forfeit the salary that went with it. His very freedom depended on it.

Given Zuma’s narrow escape around the fraudulent “loan agreements”, it is no wonder that President Zuma is trying to avoid declaring his financial interests and benefits and those of his spouses, companions and dependent children. If benefits were received and they were not declared and he was caught out again, he would surely go down.

Of course, it might be that Zuma, his spouses, companions and dependent children had not received any benefits from anyone since he had become President. Even if he and his family have indeed received such benefits they might well be above board in that they might have been given in the spirit of generosity. Unlike in the Shaik case where the money was given as a bribe, it might be that any benefits given to Zuma more recently were not given to secure favors from the President in return for the benefits. In that event, Zuma would have nothing to fear from declaring these benefits (if any).

The fact that he has not declared anything and is claiming rather laughably that it is unclear whether he needs to declare anything, will, however, raise serious questions about Zuma’s honesty and integrity and his ability to stay on the right side of the corruption legislation. If he honestly declares all his interests, he will go a long way to answer those questions and clear up the dark cloud hanging over his head. If he continues to stonewall, we will be well within our rights to conclude that Zuma has not learnt his lesson from the Shaik fiasco and that he is (still) implicated in corrupt practices.

Only time will tell.

Why is Zuma flouting the law?

Mar 8th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
46 comments

The news that  President Jacob Zuma has failed to declare his financial interests and the financial interests of his spouses, permanent companions and dependent children as required by the law, is shocking and surprising. Given the fact that the President got into terrible legal trouble after receiving more than R4 million from a fraudster and crook and then doing favours for that fraudster and crook, one would have thought that the President would be extra diligent in complying with the law to ensure that further perceptions of dishonesty and corruption do not take hold.

The Presidency claims that the President has failed to make these declarations – as the law requires him to do within 60 days after taking office – because ”there was a difference of opinion in his office on whether he was required to do so”.

Oh please! Tell me another one. I for one really do not believe this statement issued by the presidency. It is about as believable as statements by George Bush that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or statements by Bill Clinto that “I did not have sex with that woman.” If there really is a difference of opinion in the President’s office on whether the law requires him to declare these financial interests, then god help us all because then our President has people working for him that are spectacularly stupid or spectacularly dishonest – or both.

There cannot possibly be any confusion about whether the President and his family should declare their financial interests. Here is why.

Section 2 of the Executive Members Act requires the President – after consulting Parliament – to “publish a code of ethics prescribing standards and rules aimed at promoting open, democratic and accountable government and with which Cabinet members, Deputy Ministers and MECs must comply in performing their official responsibilities”. The Act, in its definition section, makes doubly sure that this Code would also bind the President because it defines “cabinet” to mean “the Cabinet referred to in section 91(1) of the Constitution” and then, just in case anybody is too thick to get it, the Act defines  “cabinet member” as including “the President.”

Section 91(1) of the Constitution - in case anyone wondered – further states that the cabinet “consists of the President… Deputy President and cabinet Ministers.” This is about as clear as any law could possibly be.

The Code itself – which gives effect to this Act and must therefore comply with that Act - states in section 5 that every member (defined in the Code to include any cabinet member and thus, according to the Constitution as well as the Act, to include the President)” must disclose to the Secretary particulars of all his or her own financial interests as well as the financial interests of spouses, permanent companions or dependent children”. Note the word “must”, as in: “One must not kill anyone”. Pretty clear really – unless one cannot read or write or unless one is a serious crook. The statement by the presidency that the Act is unclear is therefore utter nonsense and laughable.

Why would the President be flouting the Law like this? Does he have something to hide and if so what? Well, section 6 of the Code states that like all other Cabinet members, the President must disclose his own financial interests and those of his spouses, permanent companions and dependent children including: shares and other financial interests in companies and other corporate entities; sponsorships and their sources and “other assistance” and its sources;  ”gifts and hospitality” and its sources; “other benefits” and their sources; foreign travel paid by a sponsor and the description of the sponsor; the land and property owned; and the pension owned, its sources and value.

This means if the President stopped flouting the law and started to comply with the Code, he would have to declare a wide range of benefits received by himself, his wives, his known children and, perhaps, even his various fiancées as well as the names of those who have provided the benefits. Although the details of benefits accruing to his spouses, permanent companions and dependent children would be listed in the secret part of the register, the Public Protector would have access to this information if any complaint is received about a conflict of interest (otherwise called a bribe).

If anyone had paid for the school fees of one of Zuma’s children, it would have to be declared. If rent on luxury houses used by Zuma, any of his wives, his girlfriends or his dependent children were paid by others it would have to be declared. If Schabir Shaik, say, had sponsored a private holiday for Zuma with one of his wives or girlfriends, it would have to be declared.

The fact that his private attorney, Michael Hulley, is currently handling the matter suggests that there is something very fishy going on here. Remember, Hulley was the lawyer who used illegally obtained recordings to provide the smokescreen for the dropping of charges against Zuma. Hulley was not allowed to be in possession of those recordings and probably committed a crime by taking possession of the recordings. He thus seems singularly unsuited to assist the President to comply with the law as required. Given his track record, he seems like the kind of person one calls in when one wants to evade or break the law.

Why not employ lawyers from the presidency to deal with the matter? Why employ the guy who managed to get you off the corruption charges? Outwardly, this looks very bad. Why get Hulley involved if the information required by the Code will not expose the President to further allegations of bribery and corruption? Or is Hulley there to help the President to flout the law by ensuring that the President does not reveal anything that could get him in trouble?

Any member of the National Assembly can lay a complaint with the Public Protector to investigate a breach of the Code. One would hope someone would lay such a complaint as the President is clearly in breach of the Code. One would also hope that when the President is finally forced to stop his flagrant flouting of the law, that journalists would go over all the details of his dealings and will compare the names of all those who have acted as benefactors to the President (assuming Hulley has not unlawfully hidden some of the information) with the names of business people who have received tenders from the state.

Something smells rotten about this duckling and diving by the President. Anyone with nothing to hide would surely have complied with the law as the President clearly is required to do. What is going on? What does the President have to hide? More undisclosed children?

PS: I see Presidential spokesperson, Vincent Magwenya, says if the president was hiding something he would not have given such an open and forthright response. In other words, if the President wanted to hide something he would have lied about breaking the law. But he has admitted to breaking the law instead of lying about it, so its ok then. This is so breathtaking in its arrogance, that I first thought it was a quote from the Hayibo website. Of course, if the President did not want to hide anything he would have complied with the law, but he IS the President so obviously he wrongly thinks the law does not apply to him.

Jeff Radebe (LLM Leipzig) got it wrong again

Mar 5th, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
28 comments

Readers of this Blog already know that Minister Jeff Radebe (LLM Leipzig) has some pretty strange views about the Constitution. We also know that he is not a man to let the facts or an authoritative interpretation of the Constitution intrude on an expedient political argument. So it should come as no surprise that in defending the draft amendments to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Minister has completely misstated the reasoning of the Constitutional Court judgment dealing with section 49(2). Yesterday he said:

When you see the draft … you will realise that the amendment will be in conformity with the guidelines established by former Constitutional Court Judge Kriegler in State versus Walters where he elaborated the guidelines that must be used by the police. That is precisely what this amendment is about. Judge Kriegler even uses the words deadly force in setting those guidelines under particular circumstances…

Being a naive sort of fellow, I thought maybe the Minister had spotted something in the Walters case that I have missed, so I re-read the judgment yesterday. It turns out the Minister had clearly failed to come to grips with the Constitutional Court precedent, perhaps because he had failed to understand that the principle of proportionality animates the judgment.

In Walters the Court made it clear that it would always constitute an infringement on a persons right to life when he or she is killed by the police. Such a limitation of one’s rights could only be justified in terms of the limitation clause which requires us to ask what is reasonable and justifiable, having regard to the purpose of the provision and the means used to effect that purpose. The purpose of the provision can be twofold: either it is aimed at protecting police officers and the public or it is aimed at ensuring that dangerous criminals are arrested.

The amendment could not be aimed to protect police officers or the public, as the common law already allows police officers or anyone else to shoot and even kill someone who poses an immediate threat to anyone’s life.

The amendments must therefore be aimed at ensuring the arrest of dangerous criminals. But it is far too broad to pass constitutional muster as it allows the use of deadly force, as opposed to the use of that force necessary, to effect the arrest. It also allows the killing of a suspect even when that suspect could reasonably be arrested at another time and place.

The proposed amendments would allow a police officer to shoot and kill any suspect who is reasonably suspected of having committed a crime involving the possibility of seriously harming anyone if they believe there was no other way of arresting the suspect “at that time or later”. This would be the case even where the suspect posed no immediate danger to the police or members of the public and even when it would be possible to arrest the suspect at a later stage.

This is clearly not sanctioned by the Kriegler decision in Walters. What is required in every case is for a police officer to decide, taking into account all relevant facts – not only the one’s mentioned in the draft amendments – what degree of force is necessary or whether any force is necessary at all. This is what any proportionality test requires.

The Constituitional Court made clear that the purpose of an arrest is to apprehend a suspect – not to kill him or her. As Kriegler stated:

The purpose of an arrest is to take the suspect into custody to be brought before court as soon as possible on a criminal charge. It does not necessarily involve the use of force. On the contrary, the use of any degree of force to effect an arrest is allowed only when force is necessary to overcome resistance (by the suspect and/or anyone else), to an arrest by the person authorised by law to carry out such arrest. And where the use of force is permitted, only the least degree of force necessary to perfect the arrest may be used. Similarly, when the suspect flees, force may be used only where it is necessary and then only the minimum degree of force that will be effective may be used. Arrest is not an objective in itself; it is merely an optional means of bringing a suspected criminal before court. Therefore resistance or flight does not have to be overcome or prevented at all costs. Thus a suspect whose identity and whereabouts are known or who can otherwise be picked up later, can properly be left until then. Even when the suspect is likely to get clean away if not stopped there and then, arrest at every cost is not warranted.

As Kriegler made clear in Walters (in a passage obviously missed by the Minister): “It can therefore hardly be said to be justified to shoot a suspect where there is no suggestion of a threat to anyone“. But that is what the amendments would sanction. Instead of requiring a police officer in each case to make a decision about the degree of force necessary (if at all) to effect an arrest, it gives a blank cheque to shoot all people suspected of committing crimes that might have entailed the threat of serious violence – as long as that would be the only way to arrest the suspect.

Nowhere in the Walters judgment does Kriegler state that it would always be lawful for a police officer to use deadly force when it would be necessary to arrest a person suspected of committing a crime potentially involving violence. Where the Minister got this idea from is a mystery. Maybe that is what they used to teach in the Criminal Procedure class at Leipzig, but that is not what our Constitution allows. No matter what the Minister now claims, the draft as it stands will not pass constitutional muster.

The reason why these amendments are so dangerous is that it will take us back to a time before the advent of democracy when the police was generally feared instead of respected by the population because they were a law unto themselves. As we have seen police killings have been on the rise. The latest figures, tabled in Parliament in June 2009, revealed that 556 suspects — including 32 innocent bystanders — were shot and killed by police between April 2008 and March 2009. In 1996 the police shot and killed  380 civilians.

Surely if these amendments are allowed to go through we will soon be back to the kind of indiscriminate killing by the police during the apartheid era. In 1985 the police shot and killed 763 people. HOw long before we are back at that number again?

Be afraid, be very afraid

Mar 3rd, 2010
by Pierre De Vos.
62 comments

So, imagine you are driving home late at night in your BMW. You hear a screeching of tyres and see two overweight men pointing their guns at your head. You panic and – as if you are now sitting behind the wheel of one of those malfunctioning Toyota’s – your car accelerates. Bam! Bam! In two minutes you are as dead as Brett Kebble – but not from “assisted suicide”.

The police who shot and killed you will never be prosecuted – at least not if the new Draft Bill aimed at amending section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act is passed by Parliament. The police officers in their unmarked car will say that your BMW (or one that looks just like yours) was used as getaway car in an armed robbery and they were trying to arrest you – and that will be the end of the matter. Your wife, husband,  or children will have to learn to live without you – albeit in fear of also being shot and killed by the police at a later stage.

So much for your right to life and bodily integrity and the right (so often invoked by President Jacob Zuma) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Those rights are obviously reserved for politicians driving in blue light convoys, with their thuggish bodyguards carrying black bags to hood enemies of the state. According to the Minister of Police, ordinary citizens do not enjoy those rights because, who knows, they might just be criminals.

The Draft Bill contains two important proposed changes which will make it far easier for the police to shoot and kill people without having to think too hard about whether this is reasonable or necessary.

First, the prosed amendments to section 49(2)(a) would allow the police to kill a suspect in order to protect themselves or the public from serious bodily harm – even when it might not have been immediately necessary to do so. In other words, as long it would have been necessary at some point before or during the arrest to kill the suspect to protect anyone from serious bodily harm, the killing would be lawful.

The police would also be able to kill a suspect not only when it is necessary to protect someone’s life or to protect someone from grievous bodily harm, but now also when it would have been necessary to protect someone from “serious bodily harm”. However, it is not clear what the difference between “grievous bodily harm” and “serious bodily harm” might be (except perhaps that the former is more difficult to spell and pronounce).

Second, the amendment to section 49(2)(b) would also allow the police to kill anyone who is reasonably suspected of having committed a crime involving the possibility of seriously harming anyone if they believe there was no other way of arresting the suspect “at that time or later”. So, if a police officer has reason to believe you have been involved in a serious assault on anyone, or you have been involved in an armed robbery and there are no other reasonable means to arrest you on the spot (as opposed to going to your house later and arresting you there), they can kill you right there, finish and klaar.

These amendments attempt to simplify the circumstances under which the police can shoot and kill suspects. They would also make it far easier for the police lawfully to kill suspects during an arrest. It tries to circumvent the problem of a lack of police training, by minimizing the requirement for  split-second decision-making by police officers making the arrest. Officers will not have to decide whether killing the suspect is immediately necessary and will also not have to decide whether there is a substantial risk that the suspect would cause imminent serious harm to anyone.

As long as the suspect was reasonably suspected of having committed a crime involving the threatening of serious bodily harm and as long as it was necessary to kill the suspect in order to effect the arrest of the suspect on the spots (say, because the suspect decides not to stop when ordered to do so), the police can shoot first and ask questions later.

The amendments are not only illogical but clearly also unconstitutional. Maybe I am missing something, but it does not seem logical for the law to state that the police can kill a suspect “if there are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest”. If they have killed the suspect, they would not be able to arrest him or her as one cannot arrest a dead person. The proposed amendments to section 49(2)(b) must therefore be read to mean that the police need not worry about whether it would be possible to arrest certain suspect at a later date. They would be able to kill the suspect on the spot if it would not be possible to arrest him or her right there and then.

Scary stuff.

The amendments are most probably also unconstitutional. As I have explained before, in the Walters case, Kriegler J set out in admirably clear language what the Bill of Rights require from any such section, and I quote:

(a) The purpose of arrest is to bring before court for trial persons suspected of having committed offences.

(b) Arrest is not the only means of achieving this purpose, nor always the best.

(c) Arrest may never be used to punish a suspect.

(d) Where arrest is called for, force may be used only where it is necessary in order to carry out the arrest.

(e) Where force is necessary, only the least degree of force reasonably necessary to carry out the arrest may be used.

(f) In deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and necessary, all the circumstances must be taken into account, including the threat of violence the suspect poses to the arrester or others, and the nature and circumstances of the offence the suspect is suspected of having committed; the force being proportional in all these circumstances.

(g) Shooting a suspect solely in order to carry out an arrest is permitted in very limited circumstances only.

(h) Ordinarily such shooting is not permitted unless the suspect poses a threat of violence to the arrester or others or is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm and there are no other reasonable means of carrying out the arrest, whether at that time or later.

(i) These limitations in no way detract from the rights of an arrester attempting to carry out an arrest to kill a suspect in self-defence or in defence of any other person.

The proposed amendments would not require the police officer to take into account “all the circumstances” before deciding whether it would be reasonable and necessary to shoot and even kill a suspect. However, this is exactly what the Constitution requires. The amendments would tilt the scales in favor of extra-judicial police killings (a bit like the Vlakplaas hit squads but this time sanctioned by law) and will not pass constitutional muster.

The drafters of the Bill obviously failed to distinguish between cases where it would be permissible to shoot and injure a suspect in order to effect an arrest and cases where it would be permissible to shoot and kill that suspect. The Constitutional Court has made it clear that the latter would only be lawful in limited circumstances and that only the least degree of force to carry out the arrest  would be allowed.

By repeating the wording of point (h) above out of context, the drafters probably thought that the amendments would pass constitutional muster. But they failed to take into account the rest of Kriegler’s summary and have not realized that it does not give the police a blank cheque to shoot and kill suspects merely because they are reasonably suspected of committing a crime that threatened serious bodily injury.

The Constitution requires police officers to decide in each case what degree of force is reasonable and necessary to effect an arrest. The proposed amendments wants to do away with the necessity for officers to make this judgment call. This makes the amendments unconstitutional.

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