After all, they had a right to express their views, no matter how repugnant, bigoted, bizarre and superstitious I might have found these views — just as I had the right to demonstrate my love and affection to the person dearest to me. That is one of the advantages of living in a constitutional democracy. As long as one does not break the constitutionally valid laws of the country, one is free to do and say what one wants.

Section 17 of the South African Constitution states that: “Everyone has the right peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.” This right forms part of the bouquet of rights aimed at securing a democratic space in which individuals can express their views, can demonstrate in support of those views, can listen to others and consider changing their minds. If these rights are not vigilantly protected, democracy itself is diminished.

If one is intolerant of the views of others to the extent that one would take action to prevent others from expressing these views or trying to spread their views by holding marches or handing over petitions, one is intolerant of democracy itself. If one disagrees with a view expressed by others and promoted via a peaceful march, then one should counter that view with better arguments and holding another, larger, peaceful march. Not by trying to deny others their democratic rights.

That is why the actions by the Cosatu leadership as well as Cosatu members today must be condemned in the strongest terms. First Patrick Craven of Cosatu (and the ANC) called on the DA not to exercise their democratic right to demonstrate. Then the National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) and its affiliates vowed to “swamp the streets outside Cosatu House”.

Numsa spokesman Castro Ngobese complained that: “This mass gathering is informed by the provocative, deceitful and cheap political blackmail from the chief representatives of white monopoly capital and apartheid apologists the DA.” Ngobese said the DA was trying to coerce the ANC-led government, particularly its ally Cosatu, to agree to the neo-liberal proposal of a youth wage subsidy.

(Ironically the march was aimed at promoting a youth wage subsidy, a policy supported by the ANC government.)

Then this morning Cosatu members intimidated DA marchers and threw stones at them (with some reports of the DA marchers retaliating) and at journalists, injuring several people.  Patrick Craven incredibly justified this action by stating: “We showed [the DA] we would not be intimidated.” Mouthing platitudes about supporting the right to peaceful protest (as Vavi did in a tweet) after you have called on your supporters to stop a DA march from getting close to your headquarters, merely illustrates than one is a hypocrite, not that  one is a man of principle.

There is no place in our democracy for such anti-democratic intolerance. The argument that the marchers “provoked” Cosatu members who were by implication justified in using violence to stop the march, does not hold water. No one has a right to bring a violent end to a march because they believe the message of the marchers is wrong or that the marchers have no right to demonstrate close to where they work. If they had, the rights protected in section 17 of the Constitution would be illusory. Leaders have a special duty to ensure that their followers do not deny the rights of fellow citizens and they must not instigate unlawful and undemocratic action by their followers.

It is deeply disappointing that Cosatu leaders like Zwelenzima Vavi, somebody I have always held in high regard, would stoop to such a low.

Some commentators have argued that the DA was irresponsible to march on the Cosatu headquarters and that it was strategically wrongheaded. But this is a red-herring. One might well believe that it was unwise for the DA to march on Cosatu headquarters (or that they will not win any votes in this way), but there is no law in South Africa prohibiting one from being unwise. In fact, the Constitution requires the Police to protect even those who we believe are acting unwisely from the intolerant and undemocratic attacks by fellow citizens.

The Police also has a duty to protect marchers from intimidation and attack. There might be cases where intolerant citizens spontaneously begin to threaten marchers and the Police must then step in to protect the marchers. If they cannot do so, they may try to defuse the situation by diverting the march. But where leaders in effect call on supporters to deny other citizens their democratic rights, the Police has a positive duty to deploy the necessary resources to protect such marchers. The Police did not (or could not) stop Cosatu members from massing and attacking the DA marchers, suggesting that the Police is partly to blame for the ensuing bloodshed.

Lastly, I am not an economist so I do not have a strong view about whether the youth wage subsidy is a good thing or a bad thing. But if Cosatu wants to convince people like myself that it is a bad idea, they will have to present arguments to that effect. They sure as hell will not convince me of their view by stopping others from expressing the contrary view.

In fact, responding to a peaceful protest march with violence would suggest that Cosatu does not have a sound and convincing argument that it thinks will convince the millions of unemployed youth that a policy aimed at creating youth employment is a bad thing. Maybe there are such arguments, but in the absence of a cogent and sound response from Cosatu, many people will be left with the perception that Cosatu is protecting the interests of its members and do not care much about the unemployed who, after all, are not constituents of Cosatu because they are unemployed and cannot join a union.

Whether he did or did not take bribes with the understanding that he would influence the awarding of tenders in Limpopo, his defence was not plausible. This is because one does not have to sit on a tender committee to influence a tender. All one needs to do, is to ensure that one has influence or power over those who sit on the tender committee. One can obtain influence or power over those who sit on such a committee by ensuring that that political underlings sit on the committee or by bribing its members or by ensuring loyal political allies sit on the committee or by obtaining a hold over those who sit on the committee by letting it be known that one has damaging information about them which might be leaked to the media.

It is therefore not too difficult unfairly or even corruptly to influence the awarding of tenders without formally breaking the law. This is because it is very difficult to insulate the procurement process from informal loyalties and political considerations. That is why – with tenders – perceptions can be almost as important as the reality.

Not that the Constitution and South African legislation do not attempt to address these problems as best it can. Section 217(1) of the Constitution therefore states that:

When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.

Section 217(2) qualifies this general statement as it states that organs of state are allowed to implement a procurement policy providing for categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. But this has to happen in a manner that is fair, equitable, transparent and competitive.

In terms of section 76(4)(c) of the Public Finance Management Act (PMFA) the National Treasury may make regulations or issue instructions concerning the determining of a framework for an appropriate supply chain management at national or provincial level which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. However, according to section 38(1)(a)(iii) of the Act it is the responsibility of the accounting officer/authority of a department, trading entity or constitutional institution to have and maintain an appropriate procurement and supply system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Where a procurement system is established that is not fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost effective, the awarding of a tender through that system would be unlawful.

Which brings us to the curious case of the Western Cape government’s curious politicisation of the tender process in a case that implicates the government at best in improper behaviour.. During 2011, the Department of the Premier in the Provincial Government of the Western Cape contracted with a company for the provision of various communications services. Two special advisors of Premier Helen Zille were appointed to the Committee tasked with evaluating the various bids for this contract. In a draft report by the Public Protector regarding the alleged improper or unlawful participation of these special advisors in the evaluation of the bids, it was concluded that these appointments was unlawful and had rendered the adjudication management and the entire procurement process invalid and constituted improper conduct and maladministration. One of these special advisors, Ryan Coetzee, is often referred to as the political brains trust of the DA and during the last national election he was the party’s main election strategist and Chief Executive.

The DA’s obtained legal advice to try and counter this preliminary finding. The legal advice, prepared by Geoff Budlender, distinguishes between conduct which is unlawful because it is in breach of a prescription of the law and may affect the legal validity of the conduct in question on the one hand and improper because it is inappropriate in some way. The fact that conduct has been improper does not necessarily affect its legal validity.

Budlender then argues – correctly as far as I can tell – that there is no provision in the law which explicitly prohibits the participation of Special Advisers as members of a Bid Evaluation Committee. He also, rather technically and formalistically, argues that the Constitution, read with various guidelines and regulations, do not implicitly prohibit the participation of a special advisor in a bid evaluation committee. Although the involvement of Zille’s special advisors might have been improper, it may not have been unlawful. But the legal advice is not nearly as unequivocal as the DA presented it as being, as Budlender writes that the question whether the appointment of the Premier’s special advisors to the bid evaluation committee was unlawful or not “may be in some doubt”:

In this matter, however, the situation is somewhat blurred by the fact that there is no explicit prohibition of Special Advisers being members of Bid Evaluation Committees. If there is such a prohibition, it is one which is to be inferred from other provisions of the law. It seems to me that this weakens the applicability of the general proposition that the legislation contemplates that a failure to constitute the BEC lawfully is to result in a nullity.

I would argue that in deciding whether the presence of Zille’s special advisors were unlawful or not, one should look at the purpose of section 217 of the Constitution and the relevant provisions in the PFMA in order to judge whether a tender procedure complies with it and that one should also take into account the specific context of each case (as the Constitutional Court often does). One should therefore not look at this question in the abstract (as Budlender seems to do), but should look at the facts of each case and ask whether the system set up to evaluate the tender was in a particular case indeed fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective as required by the Constitution and the PFMA.

As I see it, the purpose of section 217 of the Constitution, the PFMA and the procurement regulations set up to give effect to it, is to prevent corruption and to establish a fair tender system in which political or personal financial considerations would play no role in the decision-making of the committee called upon to evaluate and award tenders. Where one of the Premier’s special advisors happens to be a highly controversial and profoundly political appointee (how could he not be, given that he was one of the leading political strategists of the DA during the last national election and that he stood for the position of the Parliamentary leader of the DA a few years ago), it is clearly improper that the special advisor should be part of a tender bid evaluation committee.

As Budlender suggests, it is arguably also unlawful as the participation of such a political animal, someone who advises the Premier and the leader of the DA and is known to be politically highly influential, would sabotage the integrity of the procurement process and would create the reasonable perception that the system is not fair and equitable. Luckily for the DA government, the Premier’s special advisors were not particularly effective and did not manage to sway the committee to support the bid of their choice, which means that the government would probably not have to cancel the contract even if it had followed an unlawful process in awarding the tender.

However, these seem to me to be a rather technical and unnecessarily formalistic approach to a matter of impropriety (or, perhaps, unlawful conduct). What, I wonder, would the DA have said if Paul Ngobeni, the then special advisor to Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, had been appointed to a bid evaluation committee of the Department of Defence? Or if Gwede Mantashe had been appointed to a bid evaluation committee in the Office of the Presidency?

Even if, following the formalistic narrow reasoning of the DA’s legal opinion, such appointments would not be deemed unlawful, they would be wrong and improper and the DA would have had a field day painting the ANC government as corrupt because of the involvement of such highly controversial individuals with clear and unwavering political commitments and loyalties to a bid evaluation committee. The same rule should therefore surely apply to the DA in this case.

It is not appropriate for a special advisor to a politician to sit on a bid evaluation committee, full stop. It is even more inappropriate if that special advisor is controversial and is perceived to be and is in fact, a politician him or herself and is widely viewed as representing the views of the politician he or she supposedly advises.

The DA would do well to stop parsing words and drop the reliance on the formalistic technical legal arguments and admit that what the Western Cape government did was wrong. Although there is no evidence of corruption, it does not make an otherwise improper or unlawful process proper and lawful.

What was Ryan Coetzee doing on this bid evaluation committee in any case? Why did he, unlike everyone else, favour a different bidder? Was he improperly pushing for the awarding of a tender to the bidder favoured by his political boss, Helen Zille? There might be innocent answers to these questions, but because of his high political profile, the perception is necessarily created that something is fishy with his involvement in this process. That is why special advisors, especially special advisors of this kind, should never sit on bid evaluation committees. Why the DA cannot just admit this and move on is beyond me.

He then proceeds to explain why the system of racial segregation and the subjugation of black South Africans by the white minority had “failed” in the following rather cold-hearted and unemotional manner:

But in South Africa it failed. And by the end of the ‘70’s, we had to realize, and accept and admit to ourselves that it had failed. And that is when fundamental reform started…. There are three reasons it (apartheid) failed. It failed because the whites wanted to keep too much land for themselves. It failed because we (whites and blacks) became economically integrated, and it failed because the majority of blacks said that is not how we want our rights…. I can only say in a qualified way. Inasmuch as it trampled human right, it was – and remains – and that I’ve said also publicly, morally reprehensible. But the concept of giving as the Czechs have it and the Slovaks have it, of saying that ethnic unities with one culture, with one language, can be happy and can fulfil their democratic aspirations in an own state, that is not repugnant.

The attitude displayed by De Klerk is shared by many (but thankfully by no means all) white South Africans and to my mind it illustrates quite emphatically why white South Africans are still widely viewed with some scepticism by many black South Africans. It is a timely reminder that many white South Africans do not “get” race and that they do not know or, worse, do not care that they are not getting it.

What De Klerk cannot admit or what he is incapable of admitting is that apartheid was not wrong – a moral abomination – because it had “failed” or merely because the human rights of black South Africans were trampled on in order to enforce the system of white domination. It was morally reprehensible because it was born out of a profound racist attitude towards black South Africans, and its logic was based on the dehumanising belief, at best, that white people were morally, intellectually and culturally superior to black people and, at worst, that black people are not fully human and do not deserve to be treated with even a modicum of concern and respect.

Apartheid was the logical result of the ideology of racism enforced by the state and could only be implemented because white South Africans believed then (as many continue to believe today – even if they are not aware of this and will deny it) that they are infinitely superior as a group to black people as a group.

Apartheid can therefore not be compared with what has happened in the former Czechoslovakia. Neither can it be compared with the impulse in Belgium for French and Flemish speakers to want to govern themselves. In these countries, different language, cultural or ethnic groups have chosen to be goverened by those who are like them, not because of the inherent belief that they are intellectually, culturally and morally superior to another group and because of the fear and hatred towards that group. Unlike with the apartheid system, the founding belief of these societies are not that its members would be tainted, subverted or defiled if they had to mix with another group whom they believed to be inferior.

The system of apartheid was not only tainted by racism or skewed by it, leading to human rights abuses against black South Africans. Racism – the fear and hatred of black South Africans by white South Africans born out of a sense of imperious superiority – was the very reasons for the creation and enforcement of apartheid.

One of the most deeply problematic aspects of life in post-apartheid South Africa is that so many white South Africans continue to deny this fact and seem incapable of confronting their own deeply ingrained sense that as white people they are generally intellectually, culturally and morally superior to most black people – although they think that by making an exception for Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu they have overcome the racism within them. Fact is: we have not dealt with our own racism, no matter how progressive we are and no matter how we claim to be non-racist. Many of us may not use the “k”-word and may express our abhorance of racism, but we cannot “unwhite” ourselves and cut ourselves loose from the racists culture and world in which we live. How could we, as racism is embedded in Western culture as a defining characteristic of that culture, a culture which helps to define who we are and where we are supposed to “belong”.

That is, perhaps, why so many white South Africans get so defensive when one talks about racism, and when one calls someone out on his or her own blatant or latent racism and why excuses are so often made for racists. Because if as white South Africans we are all morally tainted because we are white, if because being white necessarily implies that we carry within our bodies the virus of racism born out of a false sense of racial superiority, then we stop being who we think we are and we lose our sense of identity as whites who by definition are superior.

When we confront the virus of racism that pumps through our veins because we happen to be white, we have to admit that we are not superior to anyone and, in fact, we become, at least, as morally tainted as everyone else, but probably morally far inferior to black South Africans. But as the definition of whiteness implies for many white people a (often unspoken and unexamined) superiority to other racial groups, this acceptance of the fact that we are morally tainted (also) because we are white (of course, no one in the world is not tainted in some way), is literally impossible to comprehend, something that would drive one mad because, for many, it just cannot be true!

No wonder De Klerk has to insist that apartheid was wrong merely because it did not work very well. If he had to admit that the very premise of apartheid made it an evil system, he would have to confront the fact that he was part of a deeply immoral system and this would fatally undermine or even destroy his sense of self – his sense of self as an essentially good person who might (because of circumstances) have made a “few mistakes” but who remains the morally superior white person he implicitly believes himself to be.

This is perhaps also why the Democratic Alliance (DA) is finding it difficult to navigate the troubled waters of racism. Earlier today journalist Osiame Molefe tellingly tweeted: “Taking on racist models is one thing, what says the DA on apartheid denialist de Klerk.” Molefe is right, but I am not sure that the DA will be able to answer him and to respond appropriately because it would create too much tension inside the DA and that party would be at war with itself.

Fact is that the DA is between a rock and a hard place. If it really wanted to confront its image of being a party for whites, a party that arrogantly exudes the values of white superiority, it will have to confront the deeply embedded notion of white superiority that so many of its current voters (and some of its public representatives) fearfully cling to in order to retain the sense that they are essentially decent human beings. It is never easy to admit that one is not as decent as one would have liked.

What the majority of white people in the world do not understand is that it can be rather liberating to throw off the burden imposed on us by the need to feel superior to others. By admitting that it is impossible to be free from racism, given that we live in a world whose economic and social structures are based on the notion of white superiority, one is freed to begin to face up to one’s responsibilities and to begin to address the problem. If one embraces the fact that one is not special, that (like all other human beings) one is incapable of living a truly ethical life but that one has an ethical duty to continue trying to do so, it is easier to let go of the anger and the hatred (and the fear and the shame which produces the anger and the hatred) that poisons one’s life.

And now I wait for the barrage of angry posts by those who prefer to continue living in their denialist cocoon of festering anger and hatred. But whether they really hate others or themselves, only they will be able to tell.

President Zuma was also a respondent in this case and may still decide to appeal the judgment. If he decides not to appeal, the NPA will have to provide the Registrar of the court with the “reduced record” which the NPA relied on to make its original decision. After looking at this record the DA will then have to decide whether it is worth pursuing this case and whether there is merit in having the decision reviewed by the High Court.

The SCA made the following order regarding the production of this “reduced record”:

the first respondent [NPA] is directed to produce and lodge with the Registrar of this Court the record of the decision [to drop charges against Zuma]. Such record shall exclude the written representations made on behalf of the third respondent [Zuma] and any consequent memorandum or report prepared in response thereto or oral representations if the production thereof would breach any confidentiality attaching to the representations (the reduced record). The reduced record shall consist of the documents and materials relevant to the review, including the documents before the first respondent when making the decision and any documents informing such decision.

When the former acting National Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi Mpshe, announced that the NPA was dropping the charges against President Zuma, he indicated that the representations submitted by the legal representatives of Mr Zuma (as he then was) pertained to the following issues: the substantive merits of the case against Zuma; the argument that Zuma would not receive a fair trial; the practical implications and considerations of continued prosecution; and policy aspects militating against prosecution.

Mpshe made it clear that the NPA “could not find anything with regard to the first three grounds that militate against a continuation of the prosecution”, meaning that the NPA believed it had a winnable case against Zuma and that Zuma would be able to receive a fair trial. The NPA will have to produce the record and the documents which led it to this conclusion.

This means that the documents setting out the strength of the corruption case against Zuma will have to be produced along with legal memorandums dealing with allegations that Zuma would not be able to receive a fair trail because of the way in which the then Scorpions conducted the case. These documents, if made public, could be extremely embarrassing to the President as it might remind South Africans of the fact that a strong prima facie case of corruption exists against President Zuma, a case which he has never answered despite claims at the time that he wanted to clear his name.

But the NPA will also have to furnish other documents which might embarrass former President Mbeki and others who might have plotted against Zuma. This is because the reasons given for the dropping of the criminal charges against Mr Zuma (as he then was), centred on the alleged abuse of the process and as Mpshe’s statement made clear this turned on allegations that there was some manipulation inside the NPA regarding the timing of bringing charges against Zuma.

The NPA decided to drop the charges against Zuma after listening to the recordings of various phone conversations between the head of the Scorpions and other role players. Although Mpshe’s statement is coy on this issue, it appears as if Zuma’s lawyers provided the NPA with these recordings. However, crucially, it appears from Mpshe’s statement that it was not these recordings provided by Zuma’s lawyers on which it relied to drop the charges against Zuma. The following extract from Mpshe’s statement is pivotal:

It is important to note that the decision does not deal with the merits of the case brought by the DA, as the NDPP and the President have been using stalling tactics to ensure that this case is not finalized before the ANC elective conference this December. The question of whether the decision of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) to drop all corruption charges against Jacob Zuma was unlawful and should be set aside, will only be considered once an appeal of this judgment had been finalised by the Constitutional Court, and then only if the Constitutional Court confirms the SCA judgment.

Legally there is therefore still a long way to go. Even if the Constitutional Court confirms the SCA judgment, the merits of the case will then have to be ventilated in the High Court and will almost certainly be appealed to the SCA and then the Constitutional Court. But the Constitutional Court judgment might well be finalized before December, which would mean that if the SCA judgment is confirmed, the NDPP will have to hand over almost all relevant documents which were considered by the NDPP when he made the controversial decision to drop charges against Zuma to the court. The NDPP would not have to hand over the written submissions made to the NPA on behalf of Zuma as these documents are confidential – unless President Zuma waives his right to confidentiality in this regard.

As Navsa J explained, this will present difficult choices for the NDPP and for President Zuma, as they run the risk of ultimately losing the case if they fail to put sufficient documents before the court to legally justify the decision to drop the charges against the President. Such information, crucially, will have to include evidence of the tape recordings which ostensibly led to the dropping of charges as well as evidence about the way the tapes were obtained and by whom they were made. I quote from the judgment.

In the event of an order compelling production of the record, the office of the NDPP will be obliged to make available whatever was before Mr Mpshe when he made the decision to discontinue the prosecution. It will then fall to the reviewing court to assess its value in answering the questions posed in the review application. If the reduced record provides an incomplete picture it might well have the effect of the NDPP being at risk of not being able to justify the decision. This might be the result of Mr Zuma’s decision not to waive the confidentiality of the representations made by him. On the other hand, a reduced record might redound to the benefit of the NDPP and Mr Zuma.

Interestingly, the SCA decided not to deal with the question of whether a decision by the NPA to drop charges constituted administrative action under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA). Instead it found that the decision was reviewable under section 1(c) of the Constitution. This is where the curious statement of the ANC becomes relevant. In the statement following the judgment the ANC said, amongst others:

This matter, whilst it receives a deeper legal analysis, we however want to highlight the following:

• The continued attempt by the DA to use the Courts to undermine and paralyse government.
• The granting of blanket permission to political parties to can review any State decisions, using Courts.
• How the DA will conduct a review of the case when it can`t have access to all the information which informed the NDPPs decision, to withdraw the charges.

Given these facts, it is clear that democracy can be undermined by simply approaching courts to reverse any decision arrived at by a qualified organ of State.

Leaving aside for the moment that the NPA is not part of government as suggested by the statement, but in fact an independent body that must make decisions on whether to charge and prosecute somebody “without fear, favour or prejudice, the statement shows a worrying lack of understanding of the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law requires, at a minimum, that public power must be exercised in accordance with the law and in a rational manner. The ANC statement suggests that when the government of the day (or in this case the NPA) acted illegally (in the sense that it ignored the law or was not authorised by law to act or where there was no rational relationship between the act and the reasons given for the act, then a political party should not be allowed to approach a court to challenge this flouting of the law and the Constitution as this would open the floodgates of litigation, would undermine all organs of state and would paralyse government.

As I see it, this seems like an extraordinary admission on the part of the ANC that the government it heads flouts the law and the Constitution so regularly that it would be completely paralysed if it is taken to court every time this happens. Why else would political parties flood the courts (spending millions of Rand they could have spent on election campaigns) unless they believe they can prove that the government has flouted the law. I am not sure the statement was meant to make this admission, but that is the necessary implication of it. The SCA dealt with the floodgates argument in the following (to my mind convincing) passage, starting with a quote from a High Court judgment:

“One of the principal objections often raised against the adoption of a more flexible approach to the problem of locus standi the floodgates will thereby be opened, giving rise to an uncontrollable torrent of litigation. It is well, however, to bear in mind a remark made by Mr Justice Kirby, President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in the course of an address at the Tenth Anniversary Conference of the Legal Resources Centre, namely that it may sometimes be necessary to open the floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below them. I am not persuaded by the argument that to afford locus standi to a body such as first applicant in circumstances such as these would be to open the floodgates to a torrent of frivolous or vexatious litigation against the State by cranks or busybodies. Neither am I persuaded, given the exorbitant costs of Supreme Court litigation, that should the law be so adapted cranks and busybodies would indeed flood the courts with vexatious or frivolous applications against the State. Should they be tempted to do so, I have no doubt that appropriate order of costs would soon inhibit their litigious ardour.”

Thirdly, as was pointed out by Budlender, ‘if the cases are well-founded, there can be no objection to a flood of people trying to achieve justice’.

What the ANC does not seem to understand is what is at stake here: the very essence of respect for the Rule of Law, a founding value of our Constitution contained in section 1(c) of the Constitution. That section proclaims the supremacy of the Constitution and the concomitant supremacy of the Rule of Law. In fulfilling the constitutional duty of testing the exercise of public power against the Constitution, courts are protecting the very essence of a constitutional democracy. When a political party approaches the court on a Rule of Law question, it is also helping to safeguard democracy. This principle is important, and is explained thus in the judgment:

Put simply, it means that each of the arms of government and every citizen, institution or other recognised legal entity, are all bound by and equal before the law. Put differently, it means that none of us is above the law. It is a concept that we, as a nation, must cherish, nurture and protect. We must be intent on ensuring that it is ingrained in the national psyche. It is our best guarantee against tyranny, now and in the future.

The ANC should have thanked the DA for spending pots of money to safeguard this cherished principle, money they could have spent to fight elections. This does not mean the DA will ultimately win their case. This will have to be decided afresh by the High Court. There are two aspects relating to the Rule of Law that might be relevant to this case, depending on the facts and depending on the evidence placed before a court.

First, although the judgment does not expressly say so, the NDPP would not have acted in accordance with the law and the Constitution, if he had dropped the charges on grounds not provided for in the NPA’s prosecuting policy to which the NPA is bound. What will make the NDPP’s case more difficult is that the acting NDPP, Mokothedi Mpshe, had failed to refer to the prosecuting policy at all when he provided reasons for the dropping of charges. The argument would therefore be that the charges were not dropped in accordance with this legally binding prosecution policy and was thus unlawful and an affront to the Rule of Law.

But there is a second aspect of the Rule of Law which might apply here. This is that when public power is exercised in terms of the Constitution or other legislation, this exercise of power had to be rational. As Navsa pointed out, “the rule of law also requires rationality as a prerequisite for the validity of the exercise of all public power”. This means that where somebody exercises public power, there must be a rational connection between the decision taken and the stated reasons or goal of that decision. Where reasons were cribbed from an overturned Hong Kong decision, say, the body making the decision will have some work to do to convince a court that the decision was rational.

However, it is important to note that the SCA did not endorse the view that the decision would have to be viewed on these two grounds. That, said Navsa, was a question for the high court – the court seized with the application for the review. Because arguments made by the NDPP about the extent to which the decision was reviewable were premature, it was for the High Court to determine the grounds of review. Criticising the now suspended head of the NDPP, Menzi Simelane, (which was not the first time Simelane has been criticised by our courts) on this point, the SCA remarked that it “is difficult to understand why it persisted in pursuing the appeal on this aspect. It does not reflect well on the NDPP.”

It might well be that eventually a court will decide that there are sufficient reasons to grant a permanent stay of prosecution in this case. But usually those decisions are taken by a judge, not by the NDPP. If the NDPP had acted irrationally or if it had not followed its own prosecution policy it would have flouted the law for political reasons and would have treated one person – the current President – as above the law. That is why it is important that the courts decide whether this decision was valid or not. Who knows, the evidence provided by the NDPP (and perhaps by President Zuma, if he decides to release his submissions to the NDPP) might satisfy the courts that this decision did not flout the Rule of Law.

If that were to be the case, the ANC would have again have to thank the DA for clearing this up and for helping our courts to reaffirm our confidence in our prosecuting authority. At the moment the NPA is not a body that instils much confidence with anybody, as there is some evidence that it has been politically captured by the Zuma faction inside the ANC over the past three years (and there is some evidence that it was politically captured by the Mbeki faction before that). I suspect the statement was made not because of a sudden attack of conscience or principle on the part of the ANC, but rather because the judgment provided a political opening for opponents of President Jacob Zuma and needed to be discredited.

In doing so, this statement represents a worrying attack on the Rule of Law.

After all, half of our representatives at local level are directly elected in wards and no one is claiming that local government in all towns and cities is working perfectly. And, one suspects, many who yearn for the strengthening of the link between MP’s and voters would be horrified if MP’s actually started representing the true interests of those they represented and voted as their constituents want them to on all issues — including abortion, gay rights, the death penalty and gender rights.

Not that the present system is optimal. In South Africa, at both national and provincial level, we only vote for a political party, never for an individual. The political parties decide which candidates appear at what positions on their electoral lists and political parties therefore in effect decide who will represent us voters in the various legislatures. (Voters merely decide how many representatives from each party list will eventually go to the various legislatures.)

If someone appears at number 1 on the party list, that person is going to represent his or her party in the National Assembly as long as his or her party obtains at least 0.25% of the vote. If a party obtains 50% of the vote in the election, the first 200 names on its party list will go to the National Assembly.

Where the selection of representatives to party lists are done according to a system of internal party democracy and where the lists cannot be changed by party leaders — either before the election or after the election — and where MP’s cannot be removed from Parliament once elected, there is at least a semblance of democracy present in the selection of MP’s and in their post-election role. But where a political party change party lists more or less compiled in an intra-party democratic process (as is the case with the ANC) or where the members are never given a real choice but where selection of party candidates is done by an elite selection committee of party leaders (as is the case with the DA), ordinary voters have almost no say in who would represent them in Parliament.

This means that members of Parliament are not beholden to voters at all and have no independent power base and they have no incentive to listen to and respond to the wishes of the electorate in their informally allocated “constituencies”. Instead they are wholly beholden to the party bosses who can give them instructions on how to behave in the legislature, which Bills to vote for, and how vigorously to hold members of the executive to account.  As these MP’s can be removed them from Parliament if they do not behave as the party wishes, only the most brave or foolhardy MP’s will consistently act according to their conscience or the wishes of their “constituents”.

Both the ANC and the DA remove members from Parliament for various reasons or shift them around from one legislature to the other to promote or demote them. Not that ordinary voters would notice this, because we have no clue who represents us in Parliament. This is because MP’s first and foremost represent their political parties, instead of geographically defined constituencies, and can afford to ignore the voters in the area to which their parties assign them.

In South Africa the democratic nature of the system is further weakened by the fact that we have a Parliamentary government. The majority party in the National Assembly elects the President. If one party were to receive less than 50% of the votes, a coalition of parties will have to agree on the election of a President.

This means that ordinary voters has never gotten the chance to vote for the President and for the executive, who only remains in the executive for as long as the party they belong to can muster a majority in the National Assembly. THat is why Thabo Mbeki was never directly elected by the voters. He was indirectly elected by the MP’s of the majority party who elected him as President because he was selected as President of the majority party at a party elective conference where about 4000 delegates could vote (although his two elections as ANC President were unopposed so there was actually no vote by ANC members in favour of his Presidency).

Some ardent critics of this system argue that we should ditch the closed list proportional representation system in favour of a first-past-the-post system in which we elect one representative who obtains the most votes in each distinct constituency. It is argued that if MP’s were to be elected directly by voters in constituencies, those MP’s would be far more responsive to the needs of the voters in the constituencies and would be far more willing to ensure that the hopes and dreams of their constituents find expression in our legislatures.

Moreover, so it is argued, in such a system MP’s would have an independent power base and would be able to defy party bosses and act independently according to their conscience when they think this is required (say when they have to uncover a serious financial scandal or when they wished to vote against Bills introducing abortion, more controls over shoot-to-kill police officers to prevent them from murdering too many innocent civilians, or same-sex marriage).

But in South Africa it is far from clear that this will be the case and that MP’s will act in a more responsive manner — even if directly elected. MP’s are most responsive if they are scared that they will lose their seat in the next election. Where the support of major parties are concentrated in certain areas where their elected representatives will have unassailable majorities, the MP elected for his or her party will have little incentive to listen to his constituents because they will vote for him or her because he or she happens to be a member of the popular party in that constituency.

In most parts of South Africa, a ward will be either dominated by the ANC or the DA and no matter what happens (Jacob Zuma getting convicted of corruption; Helen Zille caught stealing a Billion Rand), the traditional supporters of these parties will vote en masse for their candidate and that candidate will be almost just as unresponsive to the needs of the voters than he or she would have been under a system of close proportional representation.

Moreover, where support for an MP is linked to support for the government of the day (as is the case in our system where the President is elected by Parliament and not directly by voters), it is far from clear that voters will change their electoral behaviour based on how much they like or respect an individual MP in their constituency.

Say an ANC MP works tirelessly for her constituents in Sandton and is much respected and loved because of her hard work, her fearlessness and her independent spirit, she will still lose her seat. This is because the dominant DA electorate is still not going to vote her back into Parliament because to form a government the DA would need a majority of seats in Parliament (or may need more MP’s to form a “wrong opposition”) and the voters would vote their party allegiance rather than for the individual MP. That is why individual characteristics of a Congressman or Woman in the USA (where the government is elected via independent Presidential elections) would matter far more than the individual characteristics of an MP in the United Kingdom (where the majority party in Parliament forms a government).

There is another point: In the USA, where representatives standing in elections are selected in primary elections by the voters registered as members of a particular party, the members of Congress are far more likely to respond directly to the wishes of their constituents. This means that the Congress will be far more likely to hold the executive to account and will not always agree to pass laws proposed by the President. This is different from our system where the parliamentarians are selected by party bosses or by an elite group within the party.

(Nevertheless, even in the USA, over the past 15 years the members of Congress and the Senate have become far more reliably split along ideological lines and even the most conservative Democrat is now just about as conservative as the most liberal Republican.) In the UK and in South Africa where the party leaders play a decisive role in deciding who MP’s will be, those MP’s are going to be more beholden to party bosses than voters — even if they are elected in single member first-past-the-post constituency elections.

All this suggests that changing the electoral system alone would not make a big difference in the way our MP’s operate. As long as our political culture valorises strong political parties and insists on strong allegiances to political parties and as long as political parties do not embrace full internal party democracy in the selection of MP’s, a change in the system will hardly make any differences.

And as long as voters vote for parties because of their emotional allegiance to the party, instead of voting for a party because of the ideological disposition of that party or the strong character of the representative of a particular party, the election will not produce highly responsive MP’s – no matter what electoral system is used. Here is a quick test: how many traditional white DA voters (who have voted for the party since at least 1999) have ever considered voting for the ANC? A large majority of white DA voters will vote for the DA no matter who the candidate is.

The only way to change this dynamic is to put in place mechanism to weaken party discipline over elected representatives. This can be done by enforcing internal party democracy on all parties, by protecting elected MP’s from their parties by providing them with job security for the life of the Parliament, and by introducing an element of direct representation via constituency elections. Introducing direct Presidential elections might also help, although this would provide the executive with its own mandate from voters that will strengthen the powers of the President vis-a-vis those of Parliament, leading to the potential creation of an imperial Presidency with all the concomitant dangers of abuse of powers that go with this (just ask Americans who remember the abuse of power by Richard Nixon).

There is no perfect electoral system. In the absence of a change in the political dynamics in South Africa and the watering down of party discipline, we are bound to end up with a legislature that will do the bidding of the party leadership, instead of the voters. Whether this is necessarily a bad thing is open to question. Many of the more progressive laws in South Africa would never have been passed by Parliament had it not been for strong party discipline. Progressives are therefore faced with a conundrum: in principle a more representative and democratically responsive legislature would depend democracy, but it may also well lead to a far more reactionary Parliament and government.

How do we solve this conundrum? For once, I am not at all sure whether I have the answer to this question. Maybe readers of this Blog have some suggestions?

To this end, the proposals for changes to the provincial (as well as local) government is of particular interest. The ANC document recognises that at present the provincial and local government does not function as effectively as it should to provide services to the people. It rejects proposal for the abolition of Provinces, something that is in any case not politically feasible because of the vested interests of those forces in the ANC who have access to power (and the financial perks that come with it) at Provincial level and would not want to lose their influence, power and access to tenders.

Instead the document argues that the “problems emanating from the existence of Provinces are not structural but are more functional and to do with powers… Provinces must be strengthened to play a much more supportive role to local government in service delivery. Thus the powers and functions of provincial government must be re-focused and aligned to complement service delivery at local government.” This seems correct, as the Provinces at present fails to fulfil its task because they are neither full-blown policy developers and implementers, nor mere mechanisms for the implementation of national government policies.

Provinces are seen as important in enhancing the system of both representative and participatory democracy in our system of government. However, this does not mean that the Constitution might not have to be changed. To this end the following important proposals are put on the table for discussion:

The ANC government must reform, rationalize and strengthen provinces. This must ensure the following;

• That we have fewer provinces which are functional, effective, economically sustainable, integrate communities on non-racial basis and do away with ethnic boundaries.
• That the powers and functions of the provincial sphere of government be strengthened to ensure more functionality, economic viability and racial/ethnic integration.
• The role of provincial legislatures be refocused, and mechanism to strengthen legislatures be developed.
• Consideration of municipal representation in legislatures to strengthen participatory democracy and representation.
• The roles and responsibilities of provinces to be legislated so as to remove any uncertainty and disputes. This is especially necessary since the district level of government is to be reviewed.

There is strong anecdotal evidence (as well as some research from South Africa and the USA), that suggests the race, the gender, the class, the HIV status, the sexual orientation or the education level of both the killer and of the victim sometimes play a role in the severity of the sentence imposed on a killer. A white farmer who kills a black labourer may sometime receive a lighter sentence than a black unemployed youth who kills a blonde young woman. A heterosexual man who kills a lesbian may sometimes receive a lighter sentence than a poor gay man who kills a rich heterosexual banker. And if one kills a tourist who lives in Europe one might well get a far heavier sentence than if one kills a poor black woman living in a rural area.

Given the serious delays in the Nkonyana case, coupled with reports of sloppy investigation and the stalling tactics used by the lawyers representing the killers, it is a bit of a miracle that the four men were indeed convicted and sentenced yesterday. From personal experience I know that not all members of the police are eager to investigate hate crimes against gay men and lesbians and often fail to investigate reports of assault against gay men, lesbians and transgendered persons. And if they do investigate the crimes they often fail to do so with the same diligence than they would investigate, say, the murder of a foreign tourist or a blond girlfriend of a rugby player.

This is not to deny that we have made progress over the past 15 years. At least the case was investigated and brought to court, the accused received a fair trial and the presiding officer was prepared to convict the killers and sentence them to jail – despite the fact that they “only” killed a black lesbian.

For example, some years ago Judge President John Hlophe allowed Christopher Moses “to get away with murder” because his victim was HIV positive. Moses had killed a gay man called, Gerhard Pretorius, and then claimed that, on the night of the murder, he and the deceased had unprotected penetrative sex for the first time. He also claimed that after the sex, Pretorius told him that he had HIV.

Moses’s defence, as stated by his psychiatrist, was that he flew into “an annihilatory rage” beyond his control. The state psychiatrist demonstrated that Moses could not have lost total control because the evidence demonstrated a sustained “complex and goal- oriented” attack. Academic critics argued that Hlophe should have found Moses guilty of murder and that he had misapplied the doctrine of criminal capacity to the case. The murderer’s personal circumstances indicated a reduced sentence would have been appropriate. Instead, Hlophe found that knowingly exposing a person to HIV was sufficient reason to murder them with an excuse of “uncontrollable rage”. He ignored the undisputed objective evidence of premeditation, including fetching two different knives to finish a murder and then setting about creating an alibi.

In any event, it is impossible to say whether the sentences imposed on Zoliswa Nkonyana’s killers would have been significantly lighter if the court had not made a ground-breaking ruling that the killing was motivated by homophobic hate and if this was not taken into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing. Section 28 of the Equality Act states that when the state proves that unfair discrimination on the grounds of race, gender or disability played a part in the commission of the offence, this must be regarded as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of sentence, but the court yesterday extended this to sexual orientation. This section does not mention sexual orientation discrimination or any other criminal attacks animated by hatred for gay men or lesbians

Interesting, while looking at this aspect of the Equality Act, I have been unable to determine whether the provisions of this part of the Equality Act (which deals with the Promotion of Equality by the State and private individuals) have indeed come into operation. My LexisNexis legal database states that the date of commencement of these sections is “still to be proclaimed”. This means that the positive obligations imposed by the Equality Act to promote equality and thus deal with the causes of prejudice and discrimination have never been put into force, which would be strange, given the professed commitment of our government to the achievement of equality.

Section 25 of the Equality Act spells out some of the positive obligations placed on the state by this Act to promote equality.

(1) The State must, where necessary with the assistance of the relevant constitutional institutions (a) develop awareness of fundamental rights in order to promote a climate of understanding, mutual respect and equality; (b) take measures to develop and implement programmes in order to promote equality; and (c) where necessary or appropriate: (i) develop action plans to address any unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment; (ii) enact further legislation that seeks to promote equality and to establish a legislative framework in line with the objectives of this Act; (iii) develop codes of practice as contemplated in this Act in order to promote equality, and develop guidelines, including codes in respect of reasonable accommodation; (iv) provide assistance, advice and training on issues of equality; (v) develop appropriate internal mechanisms to deal with complaints of unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment; (vi) conduct information campaigns to popularise this Act.

(2) The South African Human Rights Commission and other relevant constitutional institutions may, in addition to any other obligation, in terms of the Constitution or any law, request any other component falling within the definition of the State or any person to supply information on any measures relating to the achievement of equality including, where appropriate, on legislative and executive action and compliance with legislation, codes of practice and programmes.

(4) All Ministers must implement measures within the available resources which are aimed at the achievement of equality in their areas of responsibility by: (a) eliminating any form of unfair discrimination or the perpetuation of inequality in any law, policy or practice for which those Ministers are responsible; and (b) preparing and implementing equality plans in the prescribed manner, the contents of which must include a time frame for implementation of such plans, formulated in consultation with the Minister of Finance.

Once these sections become operational (if ever) the state will have a legal duty to take the lead in educating the public around issues such as racism, sexism, homophobia, religious intolerance (including intolerance against non-believers), and prejudices against disabled persons.

The fact that this has not happened to the degree envisaged by the Constitution (and by these seemingly inoperable provisions of the Equality Act), suggests that not all members of our government (at both national and provincial level) are fully committed to the eradication of all forms of hatred and prejudice and to the promotion of a world in which all kinds of differences between people are respected and even celebrated.

What is needed to turn the tide against prejudice and hatred based on sexual orientation (as well as race, sex, gender and disability) is political leadership from the highest level. Unless the President, the Deputy President and Ministers (as well as Premiers and MEC’s and Mayors) regularly speak out against homophobia (and other forms of prejudice) and against the violence and threats of violence that haunt especially working class, black, gay men, lesbians and other sexual minorities, attitudes will not begin to change.

Just like Helen Zille needs to speak out regularly against racism and the racial utterances of people like Steve Hofmeyer, so Jacob Zuma should speak out against the homophobic statements that are regularly made by other politicians, community leaders and religious leaders.

Until these leaders stop feeling embarrassed about the fact that we have different sexual orientations and until they stop – through their silence – from condoning the hatred and prejudice that too often spill over into violence against gay men and lesbians, attitudes will not begin to change.

A good place to start a campaign that would foster respect for difference would be in our schools. School principals need to be trained in diversity management and should only be promoted if they can demonstrate that they have taken steps to create a school environment in which racial, gender, sexual orientation and religious diversity is not only tolerated but celebrated. An environment should be created in which teachers begin to realise that they have a duty to promote the values contained in our Constitution – including the value of respect for the human dignity of everyone, regardless of his or her sexual orientation.

The truth is that most politicians are uncomfortable about sexuality issues and would rather never have to think about the fact that gay men and lesbians exist and that they are our brothers and sisters, our mothers and fathers, our sons and daughters, our comrades and colleagues. They will not speak out against injustice because they are scared that they will be viewed with suspicion (and might be suspected of being gay or lesbian themselves), so they keep quiet while people like Zoliswa Nkonyana get harassed, assaulted, raped and murdered.

White South Africans have a specific duty to speak out against racism whenever it is expressed or perpetrated by fellow whites. When they keep silent around braaivleis fires, in boardrooms, at dinner parties when somebody tells a racist joke or makes racist statements about black South Africans, they become complicit in the perpetuation of racism. Similarly, if we remain silent in the face of implicit or explicit homophobia amongst our friends we become complicit in homophobia and, ultimately, in the killing of gay men and lesbians.

How anyone can justify his or her silence in the face of racism and sexism and homophobia, I really do not know.

Lemme tell ya something. America is a great nation, because we’re a united nation and those who are trying to divide the nation as you’re trying to do here and as the president is doing are hurting this country, seriously. The right course for America is not to divide America, and try and divide us between one and another, it’s for us to come together as a nation. And if you’ve got a better model, if you think China is better, or Russia is better, or Cuba’s better, or North Korea’s better, I’m glad to hear all about it. But you know what? America’s right, and you’re wrong!

This argument is often used by the rich, who complain that the so called 99% of the US population (who are not stinking rich) may be stoking “class warfare”. It serves as a handy mechanism for stopping anyone from questioning the inequality, the unearned privileges bestowed on the rich, and the obscene unfairness of the US economic and social system and helps to protect the status quo.

I was therefore surprised when Cape Town mayor, Patricia de Lille (who used to have more progressive principles before she joined the Democratic Alliance), used this same kind of language to attack people who were planning to highlight unfairness and economic inequality in Cape Town by “occupying” the Rondebosch common (a piece of untidy, windswept grass and bushes in the middle of the leafy middle-class suburbs of Cape Town).

Last week, in a speech delivered by the mayor in the city council chambers, De Lille called the leader of the protest (a guy with the wonderful name of Mario Wanza) and his supporters “agents of destruction” and then continued:

There are those who would sooner see this city destroyed, driven in two by violence and aggression, than be a part of a shared destiny. I tell this council now, those agents of division will not win. I think here in particular of Mario Wanza, a would-be but failed public servant, who claims to speak on behalf of the people of the Cape Flats. … [I would not allow] these agents of destruction to use their misguided, naive and brutal misunderstandings of the politics of race to divide this city. … I tell the people of Cape Town this: They will not succeed because we will not let them.

Given these fighting words (with De Lille seemingly channelling her inner PW Botha), it was perhaps not surprising that the police refused to give permission for the gathering and declared the gathering “illegal”. The police did so on what appears to be spurious grounds, arguing that organisers arrived “between 15 and 30 minutes late” for their meeting with police officials and that organisers insisted on having all nine elected representatives present in the meeting as opposed to four.

These reasons are, to say the least, completely spurious, suggesting that the police had a mandate to stop this gathering at any cost. In fact this kind of reasoning has a rather authoritarian ring to it and seems to be based on the assumption that taking part in a protest is not a right, but a privilege that can be bestowed and can also be taken away by a police officer if an organiser of a gathering does not behave “properly”. This used to be the legal situation in apartheid South Africa, but as we now live in a constitutional democracy it is no longer the case. Somebody should tell the police (and mayor De Lille)

The Regulation of Gatherings Act makes it very clear that the responsible police officer has a duty to negotiate with organisers of a gathering and to do so in a way that would help the organisers to conduct a peaceful protest march or gathering. Where a police officer fails to do everything in his or her power to ensure that a peaceful and orderly gathering can take place, that police officer is breaking the law and is also infringing on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens.

Reading the various provisions of the Gatherings Act, it is impossible to see how the police could validly have declared this gathering illegal and how they could reasonably have believed that they had the right to do so. The relevant police officers either have difficulty with basic English comprehension or they deliberately decided to flout the provisions of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in order to get this gathering declared illegal (which happened to comply with the wishes of mayor De Lille).

One would have hoped that De Lille would have condemned this apparent abuse of power by the Police. After all, she is a leader of the DA, a political party who has often (rightly) expressed outrage when ANC-aligned government officials flout the law. The DA is also a party who has presented itself as a champion of the Rule of Law – even challenging the unlawful appointment of Menzi Simelane as National Director of Public Prosecutions in court. But alas, when the fears and short term interests of upper-middle class DA voters clash with respect for the law and adherence to democratic principles, one should not expect principle to hold sway. The mayor thus made statements which endorsed the dubious notion that this gathering was an “illegal” one.

The Regulation of Gatherings Act makes it clear that every person has the right to assemble with other persons and to express his or her views on any matter freely in public and to enjoy the protection of the State while doing so. As such, this Act gives expression to the right of everyone (guaranteed in section 17 of the Bill of Rights), peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.

This right is an important one for any democracy as it helps to even out the political playing field. Given the fact that access to money and a proximity to the powerful often give certain people or pressure groups disproportionate influence over the politicians and the political process, this right to protest can be viewed as a right that is of particular importance for the poor, the powerless and the dispossessed. How else will people living in poor and marginalised communities have their voices heard and their concerns listened to?

My guess is that the rather reactionary tone of De Lille’s statement and the heavy-handed and probably illegal actions of the police stem from the fear that a protest on the Rondebosch common would indeed provide a voice to the voiceless and would challenge the cosy elite pact between the politicians and the rich (the very rich whose donations keep the major political parties afloat).

Because the right to protest is fundamental to the proper functioning of a democracy, the Gatherings Act assumes that gatherings and protests will almost always be allowed and that technicalities will not be used to ban protests that would make the powers that be uncomfortable. Thus section 3(5)(c) of the Act even requires the relevant police officers to try and identify organisers of protests and gatherings and then engaging with those organisers – even if no notice was given of the protest or gathering by its organisers. Furthermore, section 4(1) places a legal duty on the responsible officer to engage with organisers of a gathering or protest to try and reach agreement about how the gathering or protest would be conducted.

Section 4(4)(b) of the Act also allows the responsible officer to impose certain conditions on the gathering or protest if there are reasonable grounds to do so in order to minimise traffic disruptions, to ensure continued access for others to their places of work and property, to prevent injury to any person and to prevent the destruction of property. When an officer imposes such conditions he or she is required by law to give written reasons for this.

Section 5 of the Act makes it clear that a gathering or protest may only be prohibited in extreme cases. This section states that:

When credible information on oath is brought to the attention of a responsible officer that there is a threat that a proposed gathering will result in serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, injury to participants in the gathering or other persons, or extensive damage to property, and that the Police and the traffic officers in question will not be able to contain this threat, he shall forthwith meet or, if time does not allow it, consult with the convener and the authorized member, if possible, and any other person with whom, he believes, he should meet or consult, including the representatives of any police community consultative forum in order to consider the prohibition of the gathering.

Only after such a meeting would a responsible officer be able to prohibit a gathering, if he or she is convinced “on reasonable grounds” that no amendment to the conditions of the gathering would prevent serious disruptions or extensive damage to property.

Now, people who are familiar with Cape Town would know that no person could reasonably claim that a gathering on the Rondebosch common would seriously disrupt traffic or that it would pose a serious risk to people or that extensive damage to property would ensue. There are no buildings on the common and nobody lives or works on the common, so how the police could have decided that the gathering posed a serious risk to the safety of people or to damage of property is beyond me. In fact, I would go as far as saying that the police acted illegally (perhaps spurred on by the incendiary comments of the mayor?) by banning the gathering. The subsequent heavy handed actions against those who chose to gather on the common and the arrest of all those who took part was therefore in all likelihood illegal.

A liberal administration would never have made the kind of statements that De Lille made and would never have suggested that the protestors should be stopped. A liberal administration would have championed the right of protesters to gather and convey their message (even in a suburb where rich DA voters predominate) and would have done everything in its power to ensure that a peaceful protest with the least amount of disruption took place. But then again, the DA administration in Cape Town can probably only be said to be liberal in name.

PS: The headline is an ironic quotation of a headline which appeared in Die Son newspaper a few years ago when it reported on the fact that “singer” Patricia Lewis “acted” in a soft porn movie.

This complaint probably stems from the fact that President Zuma, other Ministers, MEC’s, Mayors as well as the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) have all suffered embarrassing legal defeats before our courts over the past year. It is unclear why they have lost so often and so badly. One possibility is that they had received appalling legal advice from their advisors (or in the case of the President, from the Minister of Justice). Another is that they had failed to follow the sound legal advice provided to them.

This distinction between legal issues and policy decisions is, of course, difficult if not impossible to maintain. For example, clearly the President has a wide political discretion to appoint a man or woman of his choice as the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP). But if he were to appoint a convicted fraudster to that position this would be unlawful as the National Prosecuting Authority Act (passed by the ANC dominated Parliament) requires him to appoint a “fit and proper ” person as NDPP.

In such a case the court would have a duty (if called upon to do so) to enforce the law and would have to declare the appointment invalid. If the court did not have the power to enforce the prescriptions of any law, the law could be ignored and then we would potentially live in an anarchic and lawless state. But in declaring the appointment unlawful, the court would interfere with the policy choice of the President – albeit a choice that was exercised in a manner that flouted the law. In a case like that the distinction between policy and legal considerations would dissolve and would become meaningless — unless one really believed that law was not binding on the executive at all and that a court should therefore not ever have the power to enforce the provisions of a law that was passed by the legislature. Such a system would be akin to an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship in which the legislature would perform a symbolic function as a pretend-democratic chamber whose decisions would be ignored at will by the President.

But two recent decisions by the ANC and the DA do actually demonstrate the problem of purely political decisions masquerading as quasi-legal decisions. Purely political decisions recently instigated by Zuma and Zille have been dressed up as disciplinary cases in order to provide a fig leaf of respectability and legitimacy to the witch-hunts against the recalcitrant party members who have challenged the authority of the respective party leaders.

The first case is well known: a selected number of the “top six” leaders of the ANC (which happened to include Jacob Zuma and Gwede Mantashe who were both known enemies of the accused) decided to have Julius Malema charged with contravening certain provisions of the ANC Constitution. Malema was then “tried” before an ANC disciplinary committee. The committee comprised of “disciplined members of the ANC” and can in no way be considered to be independent or impartial as it lacked even the most basic safeguards that would have secured its independence and impartiality. The conviction of Malema was a foregone conclusion but in order to give this outcome a semblance of legitimacy the disciplinary hearing was conducted as if it was a legal one.

The legitimacy of the process was, however, compromised (despite the pretence at legality) because the disciplinary committee members who previously had run-ins with Malema did not recuse themselves and the committee also “forgot” to hear evidence in mitigation after it found Malema and other members of the ANC Youth League guilty of the charges.

The DA has meanwhile launched disciplinary proceedings against DA MP Masizole Mnqasela, after he angered its leader Helen Zille. This he did because during a heated internal party election contest for Parliamentary leader of the DA he stated on prime-time radio that Lindiwe Mazibuko was not black enough to become the DA’s parliamentary leader. Mr Mnqasela had dismissed Ms Mazibuko’s candidacy as “window-dressing” in the lead-up to the DA parliamentary caucus election.

Zille was not amused by this and launched a scathing attack on Mnqasela by saying he had “made a fool of himself and the party”. Writing in her weekly newsletter, Zille equated Mnqasela’s controversial remarks to “Verwoerdian thinking”, referring to the architect of apartheid, Hendrik Verwoerd. “Even in the DA, Verwoerdian thinking sometimes rears its ugly head … I may have missed something, but not once during her campaign did Lindiwe or her supporters ever say she should be elected leader of the caucus because she is black,” Zille wrote.

The DA Constitution allows for a disciplinary committee to hear such a case. Such a committee is not independent but is elected by politicians who are also leaders of the party (on a regional basis) and its members will in all likelihood not wish to upset the party leadership – at least not if they had any thoughts of getting ahead in the party and maybe even becoming a shadow minister of bottle washing or of Zille praise singing. The committee is therefore neither independent nor does it have the necessary characteristics of a body that would act impartiality (or that one could reasonably be expected to act impartially). Zille (like Zuma) has made it clear what outcome is expected of this quasi-legal DA disciplinary process and I, for one, would be very surprised if Mnqasela is not found guilty of some or all of the charges against him.

Ironically, these two examples illustrate (to some degree, at least) the legitimising power that the law still exerts over our imaginations. It reminds us of the dominance in our culture of the liberal view that the law is (almost) always a neutral and objective mechanism for the fair resolution of disputes (even though the presiding officers might get it wrong in exceptional cases and might rely on their own personal ideological views when they resolve a dispute).

But it is even more ironic that by using quasi-legal processes in such a blatant and obvious way to try and legitimise decidedly political decisions, Zille and Zuma run the risk of unmasking the political nature of most legal processes and of helping to delegitimise the liberal version of the law, a version that assumes the law is a neutral and objective mechanism for the imposition of violence on citizens. Because those highly politicised disciplinary processes abuse a quasi-legal process to give some credibility to what are essentially political decisions to act against the members of two different political parties who had dared to cross the leader of the respective parties and threatened the authority of both Zille and Zuma, people might well become cynical about the law more generally.

They might begin to think that law is merely a form of politics perpetrated by members of an unelected clan of legally trained judicial officers. After all, lawyers already know that it can matter a great deal who the presiding officer in a case is. They also know that external political considerations may play a role in the decisions taken by a presiding officer. I recall that in the earlly 1990ties, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) suddenly softened its stance on ANC aligned criminal defendants and reduced Winnie Mandela’s sentence so that the then wife of Nelson Mandela would not have to go to jail. That outcome would have been unthinkable in the mid 1980ties.

This is dangerous terrain for lawyers and judges because political demagogues and populists might easily exploit this ambivalence in the law’s relation to politics to try and delegitimise the courts and the legal process entirely. And this would open up a space for an entirely lawless and authoritarian regime to emerge in which the law on paper would mean nothing more or less than what the President said it meant.

Lawyers therefore face the challenge of producing plausible arguments about the interaction between law and politics, arguments that would acknowledge the fact that legal rules (and the way they are interpreted and applied) can hardly be said to be neutral, but that make strong claims about the ability of such legal rules (to some extent, at least) to constrain the judges that interpret and apply them so that those judges do not merely impose their own personal political preferences on the parties in a dispute before them.