Constitutional Hill

Governance

Some thoughts of the rise of traditional leaders

When the Constitutional Assembly drafted the final Constitution in 1994 and 1995, it dragged its feet in finalising the provisions dealing with traditional leadership because it was not clear how such a system could be accommodated – except in a purely symbolic way – within the democratic system of government established by the Constitution. In the end, chapter 12 of the Constitution, which contains provisions regarding traditional leaders, provided for such leaders in rather wishy-washy language, stating (in section 211(1)) that “the institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised subject to the Constitution”.

Given the fact that section 1 of the Constitution states unequivocally that the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded, inter alia, on the values of non-sexism, universal adult suffrage, and a multi-party system of democratic government to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness, section 211 guarantees no more than a symbolic or ceremonial role for traditional leaders. This is because traditional leadership is by its nature undemocratic and not accountable, responsive or open and hence not compatible with democracy if such leadership is going to be given a governance role.

As Prof Christina Murray pointed out, the fact that traditional leadership has survived at all in the democratic era is quite remarkable. This is because – as in most other parts of Africa – South Africa’s traditional leaders were co-opted by the colonial powers to help it govern rural areas. Ugandan academic Mahmood Mamdani famously described colonial tribal rule as “rule by decentralised despots”. This was also the case in South Africa. In particular, from the early 1950s under the apartheid government, the development of legislative and administrative structures in the Bantustans saw traditional leadership used to enforce apartheid and to act as local government rulers in Bantustans and retain control over black South Africans living in rural areas.

The central government’s power of patronage (which remains to this day in the form of the payment of large “salaries” to traditional leaders) was encapsulated in the apartheid government’s power to depose and install chiefs, making the chiefs an effective tool in implementing apartheid policies. Under the corrupt apartheid system the rewards for compliance could be great. As Maloka and Gordon relate, in the Transkei, where 30 chiefs were deposed between 1955 and 1958 for resistance to the demands of the apartheid government, Kaiser Matanzima of the lesser Thembu royal house won the favour of the apartheid authorities and later became president of the Bantustan.

Murray again:

Colonial and then apartheid structures also meant that chiefs increasingly turned to the government rather than their subjects for support. Van Kessel and Van Oomen say: ‘[S]tate recognition [became] more vital for the chieftaincy than popular support. Chiefs had become civil servants, to be hired, fired, paid and, if necessary, created by the government’. Expected to deliver services with no real sources of income, they used some of apartheid’s most vicious laws to support their enterprise. For instance, under apartheid’s system of migrant labour, African men recruited from rural areas to work on the mines had to have their ‘passes’ and permits renewed annually in their home village. Chiefs administered the pass book system and ran the labour bureaux where permits were renewed – and they received a ‘registration fee’ for their efforts.

Given these facts it is surprising that traditional leaders have managed to ingratiate themselves with the African National Congress in the post-apartheid era. It did so by forming the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) in 1987, just as the uprising against the apartheid state was reaching a new intensity. Chiefs saw the writing on the wall for the apartheid system (and was also being impoverished because of the collapse of the pass law system which generated much of the Chiefs’ income) and turned to the ANC. Nevertheless, during the constitutional negotiations, gender activists and “modernists” completely outwitted and outvoted the Chiefs.

Thus the tepid endorsement of traditional leaders in Chapter 12 of the Constitution as well as several provisions in the Bill of Rights which made clear that cultural rights as well as customary law would henceforth be subject to the discipline of the other provisions of the Bill of Rights – including section 9 which prohibits unfair discrimination on any ground – including sex, gender and sexual orientation.

These provisions were unsuccessfully challenged by CONTRALESA during the certification of the 1996 Constitution by the Constitutional Court. In that judgment the Court made the following statement about the difficulties of marrying a system of traditional leadership with democracy:

In a purely republican democracy, in which no differentiation of status on grounds of birth is recognised, no constitutional space exists for the official recognition of any traditional leaders, let alone a monarch. Similarly, absent an express authorisation for the recognition of indigenous law, the principle of equality before the law … could be read as presupposing a single and undifferentiated legal regime for all South Africans with no scope for the application of customary law – hence the need for expressly articulated CPs [Constitutional Principles] recognising a degree of cultural pluralism with legal and cultural, but not necessarily governmental, consequences.

But despite the incompatibility of undemocratic traditional leadership with a constitutional democracy, some elements of traditional leadership and customary law were retained. This attempt to accommodate the chieftaincy – despite its tainted past as enforcers of apartheid – was animated by both emotional as well as a practical considerations.

Given the colonial encounter and the devastation it wrought on Africans, traditional leaders have been able – despite their dark, collaborationist past – to promote themselves as symbols of the dignity of African communities and cultures – supposedly untainted by colonialism. Although it is, of course, not possible to return to a pre-colonial era in which traditional leaders, applying customary law untainted by the ravages of capitalism and the greed and dishonesty that always accompanies it, there is a strong yearning – sometimes expressed and sometimes unspoken and unexamined – for such a symbolic return to a different way of life which would signal some kind of rejection of colonialism and European imposed structures and legal regimes.

Second, millions of South Africans still live under a system of customary law, which often provides an easy and cheap mechanism to resolve disputes. Given the fact that many rural citizens are not able to gain access to magistrates courts because such courts are far away from where they live and because they lack resources to make effective use of such courts, and given the fact that, culturally, the common law or the legislation passed by Parliament do not always speak to the ways they live, organise their lives or their attitudes towards those in their community, customary law still thrives in some parts of South Africa.

It is against this background that traditional leaders (who are the main interpreters and enforcers of customary law) are making a political comeback. But because many aspects of customary law are incompatible with the Constitution, given that traditional leaders are not democratically chosen and are in no way independent (as they are paid and can be removed by the government) and given, further, the fact that many traditional leaders have been corrupted by money and greed, there are serious problems with the system relied on by so many people living in rural areas. While the system works relatively well in some places, in others it has been abandoned.

It is therefore curious that with the Traditional Courts Bill, the government is seeking to re-impose a fundamentally undemocratic system that is incompatible with the separation of powers and an independent judiciary – even on those communities who have rejected it. Why our democratic government would propose to pass a law that would potentially bolster the autocratic powers of unelected Chiefs remains difficult to fathom.

Perhaps the answer lies in naked electoral politics. The move therefore might have much to do with the perception among some ANC leaders (which might not be true) that by cosying up to Chiefs the ANC will be gaining more votes in rural areas. It presupposes that Chiefs are universally popular – which they are not – and that rural people by and large will not or cannot think for themselves and will allow themselves to be told how to vote by their respective Chiefs.

Where Chiefs are wise and benevolent and where loyalty to a Chiefs is strong, a Chief might well have an important influence on his “subjects”, but in other areas it is far from clear that support for the ANC by corrupted and unpopular Chiefs will translate into a mass vote for the ANC.

In any event, the Traditional Courts Bill in its current form is clearly incompatible with the Constitution and even if it is passed it will never stand the test of constitutionality. Why some in the ANC therefore seem to be hell-bent on passing this law – despite the dubious gains – remains a mystery.

What will happen to Minister Mthethwa?

A good politician knows how to deny something without telling an outright lie. If he or she is then caught out, the politician can claim that he or she never told a lie, but may inadvertently have given the wrong impression when denying certain facts. Sometimes for political reasons the situation may be so grave that it would require an outright lie (“I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms Lewinsky”). In others words, the politician may believe that he or she has no option but to lie in order to deal with a difficult political or personal problem. When caught out, that politician can then get into terrible difficulties, as did then President Bill Clinton who was ultimately impeached after lying about his sexual relations with Ms Lewinsky. (After impeachment, Clinton was acquitted by the Senate.)

Which brings us to the subject of this post, Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa, and his alleged abuse of a crime intelligence slush fund to fund a R200 000 security wall around his private property. Last week City Press alleged that almost R200 000 from the slush fund was used for renovations to Mthethwa’s house in KwaMbonambi, northern KwaZulu-Natal. City Press pointed out that these payments were illegal as the secret fund can only be utilised to finance secret covert crime intelligence operations. Security renovations at the homes of Cabinet ministers are done by the department of public works and have to be declared to Parliament.

But the problem for Mthetwa was more acute than the allegations of the unlawful use of a slush fund. The problem is that the slush fund is controlled by General Richard Mdluli, the head of crime intelligence, who was facing charges of murder, fraud and corruption.  Hawks spokesman McIntosh Polela astonishingly conceded last week that acting police commissioner Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi had, on the orders of Mthethwa, instructed the Hawks to halt all investigations involving the crime intelligence department. If this is all true, then it would mean that Mthethwa had ordered an end to a criminal investigation which might well have implicated him.

In any event, the Minister is not legally entitled to instruct the Hawks to halt any investigation. It is true that section 17I(2) of the now unconstitutionally declared section of the Police Service Act states that a Ministerial Committee may determine: (a) policy guidelines in respect of the functioning of the Directorate; (b) policy guidelines for the selection of national priority offences by the Head of the Directorate; (c) policy guidelines for the referral to the Directorate by the National Commissioner of any offence or category of offences for investigation by the Directorate; (d) procedures to coordinate the activities of the Directorate and other relevant Government departments or institutions. The Ministerial Committee is authorised to “oversee the functioning of the Directorate”.

This means, first, that the Minister cannot issue any instructions to halt an investigation. Second, that if meddling were to take place, it had to be done not by the MInister but by the Ministerial Committee in the form of “policy guidelines”. If Minister Mthethwa did indeed give the instruction as claimed by Polela, this was therefore not legal.

If the Ministerial Committee issued policy guidelines aimed at halting the investigation, it would demonstrate the correctness of the Glenister judgment. The current situation also seems to illustrate better than any abstract or academic exercise why the current draft legislation purporting to give effect to the Glennister judgment to create an independent corruption fighting unit, does not in fact comply with that judgment.

The draft legislation allows the very Minister who is alleged to have instructed that the investigation implicating him in corruption should be stoppped to oversee the new corruption fighting unit. A newly proposed insertion of section 17DA provides wide discretion for the Minister to suspend and ultimately to remove the Head of the Directorate from office. In terms of the proposed amendment, the Minister is empowered in terms of section 17DA(2)(a) provisionally to suspend the Head of the Directorate, pending an “enquiry into his or her fitness to hold office as the Minister deems fit” and may then remove him or her from office for misconduct; on account of ill-health; on account of incapacity to carry out his or her duties of office efficiently; or on account thereof that he or she is no longer a fit and proper person to hold the office concerned.

This means if the Minister had given an unlawful instruction to stop an investigation into corruption in which he is allegedly involved, and the head of the Hawks had refused to obey this, in terms of the draft legislation the Minister would have been able to suspend the head of the Hawks without any pay and ultimately to have the head of the Hawks fired on the vague ground that he was inefficient.

That is why the Glenister judgment insisted that any corruption fighting unit had to be free from political influence and interference (something clearly not the case at present) so that it can do its job effectively, on the one hand, while remaining financially and politically accountable, on the other hand. As the judgment emphasised, it was essential for the body to be sufficiently independent so as to enable the anti-corruption agency to function effectively without being exposed to undue political influence.

Legal mechanisms must be established that limit the possibility of abuse of the chain of command and that will protect the agency against interference in operational decisions about starting, continuing and ending criminal investigations and prosecutions involving corruption. An effective corruption-fighting unit thus needed to meet two basic interrelated requirements. It needed to be both structurally and operationally independent — in accordance with the fundamental principles of the South African legal system and in line with South Africa’s international law obligations — to enable it to carry out its functions effectively and free from any undue political influence or undue intervention.

If anything illustrates the wisdom of this finding, it is the facts surrounding the implication of the political boss of the Hawks in corruption and the attempted cover up of the corruption by allegedly ordering a halt to the investigation.

I would guess that this is why, when confronted by these allegations last week, Mthethwa asserted: “The minister wishes to put on record that neither his house in KwaZulu-Natal nor those of his immediate relatives were built, refurbished and paid for with any source of public funds or taxpayers’ coffers.” Tellingly, so it seems to me, the denial seemed forthright and categorical, yet it did not state that funds were not used for the security upgrade involving the building of a security wall, leaving open a tiny gap for the Minister to wiggle through if caught out in a lie.

City Press reported this week that City Press it has in its possession the following hard evidence proving that the MInister had misled the public:

» The risk assessment that was done at Mthethwa’s property by Brigadier T Tshika of the counterintelligence division on Mdluli’s instruction in June 2010;

» A secret services account claim form, dated September 14 2010, on which a Lieutenant Colonel DG Naidoo requested R70 738.60 “to carry out security upgrades at the minister’s official residence”. The claim was approved by then chief financial officer of crime intelligence Major General Solly Lazarus;

» A second secret services account claim form, dated December 13 2010, on which Naidoo requested R57 146.30 “to purchase building material and hardware . . . to carry out security upgrades at the minister’s official residence”, which was approved
by Lazarus;

» A third secret services account claim form, dated January 31 2011, on which Naidoo requested R67 696.55 “to purchase building materials and hardware . . . to carry out security upgrades at the residence of the minister of police”, approved by Lazarus.

This is rather damning of the MInister, who appears to have misled the public with his denial. But what happens now? Obviously, if it turns out that the Minister did lie about the slush fund and then did order the suspension of the investigation into his alleged involvement in corruption, he needs to be fired. Meanwhile the Public Protector may well be able to investigate the Minister for breaches of the Executive Members Ethics Act, read with the Ethics Code.

In terms of section 2.1 of this Code, Members of the Executive must to the satisfaction of the President or the Premier, as the case may be: (a) perform their duties and exercise their powers diligently and honestly; (b) fulfil all the obligations imposed upon them by the Constitution and law; and (c) act in good faith and in the best interest of good governance; and (d) act in all respects in a manner that is consistent with the integrity of their office or the government.

Section 2.3 of the Code states that Members of the Executive may not, amongst others, (c) act in a way that is inconsistent with their position; (d) use their position or any information entrusted to them, to enrich themselves or improperly benefit any other person; (f) expose themselves to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between their official responsibilities and their private interests.

If the allegations are true that the Minister had relied on the crime intelligence slush fund to build a wall around his private home and had then misled the public about it, he would be in clear breach of these provisions. In terms of the ACT, the Public Protector is empowered to investigate breaches of the Code on the receipt of a complaint. The President is then supposed to act on the complaint. If the Public Protector finds the Minister guilty, the President would be expected to fire the Minister as happened with the Minister of Public Works, but in this case this is less likely to happen because the Minister is a political ally of the President and the elective conference is only a few months away.

But President Zuma may be put in a very tight spot. After all, if, after a guilty finding, the President fails to act, this will further cement the public perception that President Zuma is more intent on securing his own future than in dealing with corruption and maladministration. This may, ironically, be used by President Zuma’s political opponents to question his probity and to diminish his standing before the elective conference in December. Whether he will then fire the Minister or not may well depend on whether the Minister was privy to any incriminating knowledge regarding the President himself.

 

On changing the Constitution

Recent statements by politicians about the need to review the judgment of the Constitutional Court with a view to assess the need for changes to the Constitution, is often accompanied by assurances that the South African Constitution has already been amended 16 times. It is argued that the Constitution was a compromise document foisted on the people of South Africa by evil right-wingers, that the document has become a stumbling block to the effective governing of the country and hence has become a hinderance to the economic transformation of the country. Over the past year many ordinary folk, taking its cue from those talking about changing the Constitution, have taken up this whispering campaign against the Constitution.

There are two problems with this line of reasoning. First, the mere fact that the Constitution has been amended 16 times is irrelevant, as the number of amendments is not what is in issue. Rather what is in issue is the nature of any proposed amendments. Are they good for democracy and for the country or are they bad? Would they insulate the governing party from scrutiny when it flouts the law and the Constitution or would it enhance oversight and democratic accountability for any governing party? Would amendments rob citizens of their rights and their ability to have those rights enforced by the courts, or would it make it easier for citizens to enforce their rights? Would amendments hamper economic transformation by protecting the corrupt in government and the private sector, or would it advance transformation by ensuring open, accountable and transparent government with the requisite oversight powers for the courts?

What those who argue that the Constitution has been amended 16 times do not say, is that almost all of these amendments passed so far have been mere technical amendments of no real substantive or political effect. Where substantive amendments have been made, this has tended to weaken the Constitution and the checks and balances in it, instead of strengthening it, and as such was criticised by many in academia and civil society.

But most amendments have been entirely uncontroversial.

Thus the first amendment dealt with the oath of office to be sworn by the Acting President. Amendment two, inter alia, changed the name of the South African Human Rights Commission to that of Human Rights Commission. Amendment four was needed to confirm that a provincial legislature remains competent to function from the time it is dissolved or its term expires, until the day before the first day of polling for the next legislature. The fifth amendment, inter alia, was aimed at allowing a proclamation calling and setting dates for an election of the National Assembly to be issued either before or after the expiry of the term of the National Assembly. And on it goes.

So far only four sets of amendments of some importance and political relevance have been made to our Constitution. The sixth amendment stated that the head of the Constitutional Court (and not the head of the Supreme Court of Appeal) will become the Chief Justice of South Africa and also provided for the extension of the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge by the legislature. The second part of this amendment was highly controversial as it potentially affected the separation of powers and the security of tenure of Constitutional Court judges and was vigorously opposed by academics and civil society groups. It did not help that Parliament unconstitutionally tried to delegate the power to extend the term of office of a Constitutional Court judge to the President, a provision that was first relied upon by President Jacob Zuma when he wanted to extend the term of office of former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo.

The eighth, ninth and tenth amendments were passed to introduce the highly contentious floor crossing provisions, which allowed members of national and Provincial Parliaments and Municipalities to cross the floor during two window periods — as long as more than 10% of the members of the party crossed the floor. These provisions insulated the ANC from floor crossing (as it would have required between 25 and 30 ANC members to cross the floor together) but decimated smaller parties where even 1 person could easily cross the floor.

In 2009, after the Polokwane conference and in the face of threats of factionalism within the ANC, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were adopted to abolish the floor crossing, thus protecting the ANC from possible floor crossing defections by the losing factions of party elections at national, provincial and local government level.

The twelfth and thirteenth amendments provided for the elimination of cross-border municipalities by changes to the boundaries of certain provinces. These were highly contentious as citizens living in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng did not want to be moved to worst performing provinces of the Eastern Cape and North-West respectively. Despite valiant efforts by the people of Matatiele and Merafong, and despite some promises made to the contrary before national elections, the ANC used its then two-thirds majority to force these communities into provinces they did not want to go to.

Every proposed amendment to the Constitution must surely be evaluated on its merits. Amending the Constitution is not per se a problem. Only those proposed amendments to the Constitution that will protect the governing elite at the expense of citizens or will undermine the very nature of our Constitutional democracy, will be problematic. Each proposed amendment will have to be judged on its own merit.

Which brings me to the second problem with this talk about amending the Constitution. Those who argue that the Constitution must be amended because the Constitution has become a stumbling block to the effective governance of the country and hence in effect prevents social and economic transformation, are rather vague about how the Constitution should be amended.

There seems to be two general arguments circulating and being whispered about in this regard. First, some among us are upset that the courts can review and set aside decisions by the President, other members of the executive and other organs of state, when such decisions are not authorised by the Constitution or the law, do not comply with the Constitution or ordinary law or when these decisions are not rational (in other words, when the decisions are arbitrary, made in bad faith or capricious). This argument is based on the premise that those in government should not be bound by the law and should, in effect, be above the law.

For example, if the Constitution or an ordinary piece of legislation requires the President to appoint a “fit and proper” person to a position and he then decides to appoint somebody to that position who has been found guilty of corruption or murder, so the argument goes, it is not for the non-elected members of the judiciary to declare such an appointment invalid merely because the appointment did not meet the minimum requirements set by the law.

Such an argument is no more than an argument for lawlessness. Of course, in such a case there is nothing that prevents the legislature from amending the relevant legislation (or the Constitution – if the requisite majority can be mustered to do so) to abolish the requirement that only a “fit and proper” person should be appointed to the job. What cannot ever be accepted in a constitutional democracy, is a situation where the law and the Constitution can be flouted at will, with no recourse open to the courts to check this flouting of the law.

A second argument is made that the Constitution is a compromise document agreed on by the Constitutional Assembly in line with the 34 Constitutional Principles contained in the interim Constitution and as such lacks legitimacy because it contains many anti-transformation provisions.

Of course, the interim Constitution contained a provision that would have allowed the final certified Constitution to be submitted to voters in a referendum if two-thirds of the members of the Constitutional Assembly could not agree on the text. If at least 60% of the voters approved of the draft Constitution in a referendum, it would have taken effect. The ANC and the NP both avoided this by agreeing on the text. The fact that a referendum was never enforced suggest that the ANC was worried that its version of the Constitution would not obtain a 60% majority in a referendum. Instead both parties, after extensive public participation, agreed to a document which it could live with – although almost all commentators have since argued that the ANC out negotiated the National Party and secured a Constitution that was far closer to its original plans than they could have dreamed about.

In any case, it is unclear which provisions of the Constitution hinders social and economic transformation in South Africa. The property clause is often singled out in this regard, but as I have pointed out several time before that section does not require a “willing-buyer willing-seller” land reform process. Neither does it require the payment of market value for all land expropriated for purposes of land reform. Those who claim that the Constitution obstructs social and economic change has not yet been able to point to any other provisions in the Constitution that mitt be objectionable. This is probably because there are none.

Ours is not an exclusively liberal Constitution. Although it contains a system of government based on the separation of powers and checks and balances as well as all the traditional liberal human rights like freedom of expression, it also contains a set of social and economic rights that places a positive duty on the state to take reasonable steps to provide better and more expansive access to housing, health care, education and other social and economic rights. Moreover, the Constitution applies, to a large degree, horizontally also binding private individuals and institutions like businesses. This aspect is based on the view that the human rights of an individual can be trampled on not only by the state but also by powerful private interests and by individuals.

My question would be: which sections of the Constitution exactly are those that hinder transformation? In my view there are no such sections to be found in our Constitution. Those who argue that it might be time to amend the Constitution to effect social and economic transformation need to say which sections they find objectionable. We can then have a sensible debate about this question. In the absence of such clear proposals and arguments, the mutterings and whispers about the need to change the Constitution can be treated as ill-informed and self serving drivel by those who are seeking a scapegoat to avoid accountability for governance failures over the past 18 years.

My challenge to those who whisper and grumble about the need to change the Constitution is this: either put your cards on the table so that we can debate the issue or stop your self-serving campaign to discredit the Constitution. In the absence of concrete proposals one will have to assume that those who talk about changes to the Constitution are not interested in the well-being of South Africans, but rather in retaining power and access to tenders by scapegoating the Constitution.

How can we solve problems with our electoral system?

In certain circles it is fashionable to complain about South Africa’s electoral system and to state that South Africa’s democracy will work almost perfectly if only we changed the electoral system. But although our electoral system is far from perfect, the changing of the electoral system will not magically turn our MP’s into fearless fighter for justice. Neither will it necessarily bring elected representatives closer to the people.

After all, half of our representatives at local level are directly elected in wards and no one is claiming that local government in all towns and cities is working perfectly. And, one suspects, many who yearn for the strengthening of the link between MP’s and voters would be horrified if MP’s actually started representing the true interests of those they represented and voted as their constituents want them to on all issues — including abortion, gay rights, the death penalty and gender rights.

Not that the present system is optimal. In South Africa, at both national and provincial level, we only vote for a political party, never for an individual. The political parties decide which candidates appear at what positions on their electoral lists and political parties therefore in effect decide who will represent us voters in the various legislatures. (Voters merely decide how many representatives from each party list will eventually go to the various legislatures.)

If someone appears at number 1 on the party list, that person is going to represent his or her party in the National Assembly as long as his or her party obtains at least 0.25% of the vote. If a party obtains 50% of the vote in the election, the first 200 names on its party list will go to the National Assembly.

Where the selection of representatives to party lists are done according to a system of internal party democracy and where the lists cannot be changed by party leaders — either before the election or after the election — and where MP’s cannot be removed from Parliament once elected, there is at least a semblance of democracy present in the selection of MP’s and in their post-election role. But where a political party change party lists more or less compiled in an intra-party democratic process (as is the case with the ANC) or where the members are never given a real choice but where selection of party candidates is done by an elite selection committee of party leaders (as is the case with the DA), ordinary voters have almost no say in who would represent them in Parliament.

This means that members of Parliament are not beholden to voters at all and have no independent power base and they have no incentive to listen to and respond to the wishes of the electorate in their informally allocated “constituencies”. Instead they are wholly beholden to the party bosses who can give them instructions on how to behave in the legislature, which Bills to vote for, and how vigorously to hold members of the executive to account.  As these MP’s can be removed them from Parliament if they do not behave as the party wishes, only the most brave or foolhardy MP’s will consistently act according to their conscience or the wishes of their “constituents”.

Both the ANC and the DA remove members from Parliament for various reasons or shift them around from one legislature to the other to promote or demote them. Not that ordinary voters would notice this, because we have no clue who represents us in Parliament. This is because MP’s first and foremost represent their political parties, instead of geographically defined constituencies, and can afford to ignore the voters in the area to which their parties assign them.

In South Africa the democratic nature of the system is further weakened by the fact that we have a Parliamentary government. The majority party in the National Assembly elects the President. If one party were to receive less than 50% of the votes, a coalition of parties will have to agree on the election of a President.

This means that ordinary voters has never gotten the chance to vote for the President and for the executive, who only remains in the executive for as long as the party they belong to can muster a majority in the National Assembly. THat is why Thabo Mbeki was never directly elected by the voters. He was indirectly elected by the MP’s of the majority party who elected him as President because he was selected as President of the majority party at a party elective conference where about 4000 delegates could vote (although his two elections as ANC President were unopposed so there was actually no vote by ANC members in favour of his Presidency).

Some ardent critics of this system argue that we should ditch the closed list proportional representation system in favour of a first-past-the-post system in which we elect one representative who obtains the most votes in each distinct constituency. It is argued that if MP’s were to be elected directly by voters in constituencies, those MP’s would be far more responsive to the needs of the voters in the constituencies and would be far more willing to ensure that the hopes and dreams of their constituents find expression in our legislatures.

Moreover, so it is argued, in such a system MP’s would have an independent power base and would be able to defy party bosses and act independently according to their conscience when they think this is required (say when they have to uncover a serious financial scandal or when they wished to vote against Bills introducing abortion, more controls over shoot-to-kill police officers to prevent them from murdering too many innocent civilians, or same-sex marriage).

But in South Africa it is far from clear that this will be the case and that MP’s will act in a more responsive manner — even if directly elected. MP’s are most responsive if they are scared that they will lose their seat in the next election. Where the support of major parties are concentrated in certain areas where their elected representatives will have unassailable majorities, the MP elected for his or her party will have little incentive to listen to his constituents because they will vote for him or her because he or she happens to be a member of the popular party in that constituency.

In most parts of South Africa, a ward will be either dominated by the ANC or the DA and no matter what happens (Jacob Zuma getting convicted of corruption; Helen Zille caught stealing a Billion Rand), the traditional supporters of these parties will vote en masse for their candidate and that candidate will be almost just as unresponsive to the needs of the voters than he or she would have been under a system of close proportional representation.

Moreover, where support for an MP is linked to support for the government of the day (as is the case in our system where the President is elected by Parliament and not directly by voters), it is far from clear that voters will change their electoral behaviour based on how much they like or respect an individual MP in their constituency.

Say an ANC MP works tirelessly for her constituents in Sandton and is much respected and loved because of her hard work, her fearlessness and her independent spirit, she will still lose her seat. This is because the dominant DA electorate is still not going to vote her back into Parliament because to form a government the DA would need a majority of seats in Parliament (or may need more MP’s to form a “wrong opposition”) and the voters would vote their party allegiance rather than for the individual MP. That is why individual characteristics of a Congressman or Woman in the USA (where the government is elected via independent Presidential elections) would matter far more than the individual characteristics of an MP in the United Kingdom (where the majority party in Parliament forms a government).

There is another point: In the USA, where representatives standing in elections are selected in primary elections by the voters registered as members of a particular party, the members of Congress are far more likely to respond directly to the wishes of their constituents. This means that the Congress will be far more likely to hold the executive to account and will not always agree to pass laws proposed by the President. This is different from our system where the parliamentarians are selected by party bosses or by an elite group within the party.

(Nevertheless, even in the USA, over the past 15 years the members of Congress and the Senate have become far more reliably split along ideological lines and even the most conservative Democrat is now just about as conservative as the most liberal Republican.) In the UK and in South Africa where the party leaders play a decisive role in deciding who MP’s will be, those MP’s are going to be more beholden to party bosses than voters — even if they are elected in single member first-past-the-post constituency elections.

All this suggests that changing the electoral system alone would not make a big difference in the way our MP’s operate. As long as our political culture valorises strong political parties and insists on strong allegiances to political parties and as long as political parties do not embrace full internal party democracy in the selection of MP’s, a change in the system will hardly make any differences.

And as long as voters vote for parties because of their emotional allegiance to the party, instead of voting for a party because of the ideological disposition of that party or the strong character of the representative of a particular party, the election will not produce highly responsive MP’s – no matter what electoral system is used. Here is a quick test: how many traditional white DA voters (who have voted for the party since at least 1999) have ever considered voting for the ANC? A large majority of white DA voters will vote for the DA no matter who the candidate is.

The only way to change this dynamic is to put in place mechanism to weaken party discipline over elected representatives. This can be done by enforcing internal party democracy on all parties, by protecting elected MP’s from their parties by providing them with job security for the life of the Parliament, and by introducing an element of direct representation via constituency elections. Introducing direct Presidential elections might also help, although this would provide the executive with its own mandate from voters that will strengthen the powers of the President vis-a-vis those of Parliament, leading to the potential creation of an imperial Presidency with all the concomitant dangers of abuse of powers that go with this (just ask Americans who remember the abuse of power by Richard Nixon).

There is no perfect electoral system. In the absence of a change in the political dynamics in South Africa and the watering down of party discipline, we are bound to end up with a legislature that will do the bidding of the party leadership, instead of the voters. Whether this is necessarily a bad thing is open to question. Many of the more progressive laws in South Africa would never have been passed by Parliament had it not been for strong party discipline. Progressives are therefore faced with a conundrum: in principle a more representative and democratically responsive legislature would depend democracy, but it may also well lead to a far more reactionary Parliament and government.

How do we solve this conundrum? For once, I am not at all sure whether I have the answer to this question. Maybe readers of this Blog have some suggestions?

There was no coup to oust Mbeki

It is ironic that Reverend Frank Chikane now claims (in his book Eight Days in September: The Removal of Thabo Mbeki) that the removal by the ANC leadership of President Thabo Mbeki as President was akin to a coup d’état.

After all, Chikane loyally served President Thabo Mbeki through thick and thin: through his late night, Internet searches aimed at uncovering the “truth” about Aids (a “truth” peddled by crackpot Aids denialists); trough his undermining of Parliament when his enforcer, Essops Fables, forced the ANC members of Scopa to stop digging for dirt on the arms deal scandal engulfing the ANC; through his flouting of the constitutional provision that the National Director of Public Prosecutions had to act without fear, favour or prejudice (even when he needed to arrest an old Police Commissioner friend of the President) when he suspended Vusi Pikoli.

The claim is, of course, nonsense and has no basis in fact or law.

In his book, Chikane states several times that the removal of Mbeki was something close to a coup. On page 143 of his book he finally attempts to justify this extraordinary claim. He argues that given the 60%-40% support for Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki at Polokwane, it was no forgone conclusion that 50% of the members of the National Assembly would have voted for a motion of no confidence in President Mbeki. He also states that the President could not have been removed legally and constitutionally from his post as President.

The Constitution, read with the Electoral Act, tells a different story. There are two provisions in the Constitution providing for the removal of a sitting President. Section 89(1) of the Constitution allows for the removal of a President on non-political grounds. It states that:

The National Assembly, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of its members, may remove the President from office only on the grounds of: (a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law; (b) serious misconduct; or (c) inability to perform the functions of office.

So, where the President is convicted, say, of fraud and corruption, or where it is found that the President had misused his powers to protect a friend in an unlawful manner, or when the President had a stroke and could not speak anymore, then two-thirds of the members of Parliament could remove that President from office. These grounds are “objective” in the sense that Parliament would only be able to impeach a President in this way if some factual basis existed to justify the removal.

But this is not the only provision allowing for the removal of the President from his or her position. Section 102(2) of the Constitution allows for the “political” removal of a President and states that:

If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign.

This provision relates to the system of Parliamentary government operating in South Africa. The President is elected by Parliament (the President is a member of Parliament for the few hours from his or her swearing in until his or her election after which he or she stops being a member of Parliament), all but two of the cabinet Ministers must also at all times be members of Parliament. This means that in theory the President and his or her cabinet must at all times retain the political confidence of the majority of members of Parliament. If the President loses this confidence, the majority can rely on section 102(2) and remove the President for any reason it wished.

Members of Parliament could therefore decide that they had stopped having confidence in the President, say, because the President had lost an internal party election or because he was supporting a neo-liberal economic policy or because he was unfriendly or because he was seen enjoying a drink with the leader of the opposition. It matters not what the reason is, if Parliament loses confidence in the President it can pass a vote by simple majority and that is the end of the President.

Now, in our system, with one party — the ANC – retaining more than 65% of the votes in the National Assembly, and with the imposition of strict party discipline on members of Parliament, the ANC could at any time instruct its MP’s to impose and vote for a vote of no confidence in the President.

If President Mbeki had refused to resign, he would have suffered the indignity of losing such a vote of no confidence. This is because every ANC member of Parliament would have been instructed to vote for the motion of no confidence. If they had refused, they would have been redeployed. If they had refused to be redeployed they would have been expelled from the ANC and would automatically have lost their seat in the National Assembly. They would then have been replaced with Jacob Zuma loyalists and that would have been the end of Mbeki. IF Mbeki refused to resign he would have been booted out in the most undignified way, so his agreement to resign was in his own interest.

There was therefore no way in which President Mbeki could have clung onto the Presidency once the ANC leadership had decided he had to go. That is the obvious consequence of our system of government and our electoral system, in which we vote for a party and not for individual MP’s who can make their own decisions and can defy the party leadership if they are brave enough. In South Africa defying the instructions from the party leaders is not brave, it is suicidal because one will eventually be kicked out of the party and out of Parliament, finish and klaar (as Mbeki’s crook of a friend used to say).

There was no  coup d’état. There was nothing close to a coup. Instead there was a loss of political support for the President inside the ANC and like Tony Blair and Margareth Thatcher in the UK, he had to resign as a result of this. It is true that the ANC insisted on receiving a letter of resignation from the President, who insisted that the Speaker of the National Assembly had to receive this letter. It is also true that until the Speaker had been informed about the resignation it would not have had any legal effect. A letter sent by the President to his party signalling his intention to resign formally as President, would have calmed the waters, but it would not in itself have signalled his official resignation. All that was required from the President was to send another letter to the Speaker, something one assumes he was capable of doing.

Mbeki was no martyr. He was merely the victim of his decision to stand for a third term as ANC President so as to try and remote control the President of the country (a-la-Putin) while serving as leader of the ANC, something he would have been able to do for exactly the same political reasons his opponents were able to force him to resign: those who control the party, control the Presidency.

That is the way our system operates. This system is made worse by the fact that the way in which our Electoral Law is interpreted means that members of a political party can be redeployed to and from Parliament as the list of potential MP’s can be changed at various times during the life of the Parliament. Somebody can therefore be shifted from the Western Cape Provincial Parliament to the National Assembly and vice versa without too much trouble. This means that members of Parliament live in fear of their bosses. If you happen to be in the majority party (either nationally or in the provinces) those bosses are the very people you are constitutionally required to hold to account.

No wonder our national and provincial Parliaments are so weak and our Ministers and MEC’s often so imperious and arrogant. If we are talking about amending the Constitution, maybe this is where we should start.

We might think the system is anti-democratic or that it provides far too much power for party bosses and invites a blurring of the boundaries between the governing party and the state (which it clearly does), but until we change the Constitution (something the ANC will not do as it will weaken the extra-Parliamentary wing of the Party and will empower the Parliamentary wing of the party), there is nothing to be done about this.

Thoughts on scapegoating and endemic corruption

I am currently reading Michela Wrong’s brilliant but depressing, It’s Our Turn To Eat, the story of John Githongo, the Kenyan whistle-blower who took on the government of President Mwai Kibaki, whose members were turning out to be just as deeply mired in corruption as the outgoing government of former President Daniel arap Moi. The book shows what happens if the ruling political class of a country becomes enmeshed in endemic corruption and how difficult it is to turn back the tide of corruption once it has engulfed the ruling party and its leaders.

The members of the elite are usually bribed by members of local big business or by foreign businessmen and women, out to make a fast buck at the expense of the poor. The corrupt political elites make obscene amounts of money while the business elites rake in huge profits by providing shoddy products and services (from houses, to building leases, to medical supplies, to computer equipment) at hugely inflated prices – all because they had paid the requisite bribes to the ruling party or the relevant leaders of that party.

The voters (and especially the poorest voters who have no political connections and who rely on the government to provide it with basic services and opportunities to enhance their life chances) end up suffering while their leaders flaunt their money by buying Rolex watches, expensive cars and gaudy three story faux Tuscan Villas that resemble badly made children’s birthday cakes. (In one poignant scene Githongo relates how it took just three months before the newly installed Kibaki was spotted with a brand new Rolex watch, a sure sign that corruption has set in, according to him.)

It becomes almost impossible to stop this tide of corruption because of an absence of truly independent institutions with the requisite power to investigate and prosecute corruption at every level. If corruption goes right to the top, and if those at the top know that they are protected from criminal investigation or prosecution because they control the police, the intelligence services (who can be relied upon to launch smear campaigns against anyone who asks too many questions or can intimidate and blackmail those who wish to fight corruption) then there is no way that corruption will be stopped. When one is safe in the knowledge that loyal lieutenants are in charge of the police, the intelligence services and any other corruption busting unit, then one can “eat” at one’s hearts content.

Of course, all the “eating” leads to discontent from voters, so a governing party, deeply mired in corruption, will then have to find scapegoats to blame for its shoddy performance and for the lack of service delivery brought about by their corrupt “eating” of state resources. One can blame the last remaining members of the former colonial elite who might be quite rich and might easily be painted as the original perpetrators of the injustices still suffered by the impoverished and unconnected citizens (especially if those colonial types have shown no remorse for their involvement in past injustice and no readiness to help build a new society, instead whining and moaning from the side-lines with a metaphoric white bread clutched under each arm).

One may also blame the Constitution or the judges who interpret and apply the Constitution and argue that these untransformed judges and a Constitution imposed by the colonists are to blame for the slow pace of change. One can blame the opposition party who, instead of loyally trying to help solve problems, moan and complain in a most disgracefully disloyal and unpatriotic manner. Or one can try to redirect the anger of voters to unpopular groups in society: gays and lesbians; foreigners from elsewhere on the continent, Jews or Indians.

It is in this context that the abolition of the Scorpions, its replacement by The Hawks and the eventual decision by a majority of judges of the Constitutional Court declaring invalid the creation of The Hawks must be seen. Although the majority judgment is probably not the best argued judgment ever delivered by the Constitutional Court, it does attempt to grapple with the problem of how to fight corruption in a country where loyalty to the ANC might well mute most attempts by crime fighting bosses to engage in a fearless fight against corruption – even if the corruption leads to the highest level.

The Constitutional Court reminded us that only an independent body – one that is viewed as independent and is indeed independent – would stand a chance of fighting corruption.

Thus the majority judgment stated that the Constitution‘s requirement that a politician must be responsible for policing does not require that the anti-corruption unit must itself function under political oversight. This did not mean that such a body had to be insulated from political accountability. But it did mean that such a body had to be insulated from “a degree of management by political actors that threatens imminently to stifle the independent functioning and operations of the unit”.

But for the majority the gravest problem with the Hawks arises from the fact that the new entity‘s activities must be coordinated by Cabinet. The statute provides that a Ministerial Committee, which must include at least the Ministers for Police, Finance, Home Affairs, Intelligence and Justice may determine policy guidelines in respect of the functioning of the Hawks as well as for the selection of national priority offences. The Hawks is therefore not explicitly a corruption fighting unit. It is a unit that fights “priority crimes” and the politicians could decide what these “priority crimes” should be. This creates a risk of political and executive influence over the Hawks. As the majority pointed out:

It is true that the policy guidelines the Ministerial Committee may issue could be broad and thus harmless. But they might not be broad and harmless. Nothing in the statute requires that they be. Indeed, the power of the Ministerial Committee to determine guidelines appears to be untrammelled. The guidelines could, thus, specify categories of offences that it is not appropriate for the DPCI [the Hawks] to investigate — or, conceivably, categories of political office-bearers whom the DPCI is prohibited from investigating.

It therefore came as a surprise to read that the proposed amendments to the South African Police Service Act purporting to give effect to the Glenister case does not remove the power of the politicians over the “new” body. Instead, it seems to grant more power to the Minister of Police (and more worrying, to the Intelligence Services) to Appoint and fire the head of the “new” unit.

In terms of this draft law the Minister appoints the head of the Directorate, who can investigate corruption but “subject to policy guidelines issued by the Minister and approved by Parliament” This means that the politicians will in effect control the kind of cases that the new unit will be able to investigate.

The Minister may suspend and ultimately fire the Director on the basis of relatively objective criteria such as misconduct, ill-health and him no longer being a fit and proper person, but also for a completely vague reason that he or she can no longer fulfil the duties of the office efficiently. Incidentally this section is headed “loss of confidence in the Head of the Directorate” which gives the game away: if the Minister no longer has confidence that the Director will investigate the “right” types of corruption and not the “wrong” types of corruption, he will be done for.

The Intelligence Service is also given powers to grant or withdraw security clearance to anyone working at this “independent” body. If clearance is withdrawn that person will no longer be able tow ork for the independent corruption fighting body. This means that the politician who controls the intelligence services (in our case this will be the President) will be able to make sure that no investigator in this “independent” unit will make too much trouble for those who are too well-connected or too close to the President himself.

The members of the “new” “independent” Directorate also remain members of the South African Police Service with all the duties of a normal Police officer.

After a first look, these proposals do not seem to come near to meeting the requirements for an independent corruption fighting unit as set out by the majority in the Glenister case. Of course, the truth of the matter is that if the corruption goes right to the top and if the intelligence services are in on the “eating” then it will probably make very little difference what “independent” corruption fighting body is created as it will not be able to fight the endemic corruption engulfing the governing party and the state.

The sad fact is that we will know that we are at that point when the scapegoating of the Constitution or other easy targets like foreigners or gays and lesbians by the ruling party reaches such a crescendo that it cannot but be an excuse to hide behind to evade responsibility for its corrupt governance. I leave it up to readers of this Blog to decide for themselves whether we have reached or are about to reach that point in South Africa.

A re-think on the Provinces?

The various ANC discussion documents released by the ANC regarding the so called “second transition” makes for interesting reading. As the dominant party in our democracy, one that styles itself as a movement that represents the hopes and dreams of the nation (rather than as a normal political party) and as the driver of social change, the ANC’s discussion documents grapple with what it sees as the challenge of strengthening the party’s hold on state power, and to transform the state machinery to serve the cause of social change.

To this end, the proposals for changes to the provincial (as well as local) government is of particular interest. The ANC document recognises that at present the provincial and local government does not function as effectively as it should to provide services to the people. It rejects proposal for the abolition of Provinces, something that is in any case not politically feasible because of the vested interests of those forces in the ANC who have access to power (and the financial perks that come with it) at Provincial level and would not want to lose their influence, power and access to tenders.

Instead the document argues that the “problems emanating from the existence of Provinces are not structural but are more functional and to do with powers… Provinces must be strengthened to play a much more supportive role to local government in service delivery. Thus the powers and functions of provincial government must be re-focused and aligned to complement service delivery at local government.” This seems correct, as the Provinces at present fails to fulfil its task because they are neither full-blown policy developers and implementers, nor mere mechanisms for the implementation of national government policies.

Provinces are seen as important in enhancing the system of both representative and participatory democracy in our system of government. However, this does not mean that the Constitution might not have to be changed. To this end the following important proposals are put on the table for discussion:

The ANC government must reform, rationalize and strengthen provinces. This must ensure the following;

  • That we have fewer provinces which are functional, effective, economically sustainable, integrate communities on non-racial basis and do away with ethnic boundaries.
  • That the powers and functions of the provincial sphere of government be strengthened to ensure more functionality, economic viability and racial/ethnic integration.
  • The role of provincial legislatures be refocused, and mechanism to strengthen legislatures be developed.
  • Consideration of municipal representation in legislatures to strengthen participatory democracy and representation.
  • The roles and responsibilities of provinces to be legislated so as to remove any uncertainty and disputes. This is especially necessary since the district level of government is to be reviewed.

It is difficult not to read these proposals, with its emphasis on the need for the integration of racial and ethnic communities, as being partly aimed at the Western Cape, where the DA is in power and where Africans do not form a majority of the electorate. The ANC document seems to recognise the potentially controversial nature of any rationalisation of the Provinces – especially if it will involve the Western Cape – and as such the discussion document contains assurances that the “process to reform, rationalise and strengthen provinces” will be “open, democratic and ensure broader consultation and participation by the public”. The document then continues:

The ANC must give serious consideration to constitutional requirements to carry out the above, in case there is a need for fundamental changes to provinces. The envisaged policy changes might require constitutional amendments. The key political parties must be sufficiently consulted and be allowed a space to play a role in shaping the provincial reforms.

These sensitivities may also relate to the fact that any changes to the Constitution to rationalise the Provinces will not be easily achieved. Section 74(3) of the Constitution states that most provisions in the Constitution may be amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members; and also by the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces, if the amendment relates to a matter that affects the National Council of Provinces; alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter.

More importantly, section 74(8) states that any amendment that relates to a matter that affects the NCOP; alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter, but “concerns only a specific province or provinces”, can only be passed by the National Council of Provinces if the amendment “has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the province or provinces concerned”.

This means that any amendment to the boundaries of the Western Cape Province will have to be approved by the Western Cape legislature, something that seems unlikely as long as the DA controls the Western Cape legislature. If such amendments are indeed envisaged, there are two ways around this problem.

The first would be for the ANC to win the next Provincial election in the Western Cape, something that seems unlikely in the near future. The DA has the power of incumbency that works in its favour and it will use that power (and the resources that it controls because of this) to good effect to ensure its dominance in the Province in the near future. Moreover, the ANC in the Western Cape is internally weak and has not yet recovered from the destructive internal battles which raged during the tenure of former Premier Ebrahim Rasool, leaving the party in a relatively weak position.

The second would be to try and amend section 74(8) of the Constitution itself in order to scrap the provision that would require the support of the Provincial legislature for any changes in Provincial boundaries. As section 74(8) itself does not contain a super entrenchment provision regarding its own amendment and thus does not prohibit an amendment of section 74(8) except with the approval of all the Provincial legislatures, this would be possible as long as the governing party could obtain a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, something that might be achievable through co-option of smaller parties in the National Assembly (or through achievement of a two-thirds majority in the next national election).

Amending the boundaries of the Western Cape would make a lot of political sense for the ANC. Political scientists who write about one party dominant democracies have argued — often pointing to the loss of electoral dominance by the Indian Congress Party after it started losing elections in various states — that one way in which a dominant party often loses its electoral dominance is when other parties start winning regional elections. When this happens, the smaller parties (in this case it would be the DA) will suddenly gain an independent governance base and access to power and resources at a regional level. Ambitious politicians will then no longer have to join or remain in the dominant party to become part of government while the smaller parties can theoretically demonstrate that it is capable of governing just as well or much better than the dominant party.

The smaller party who wins a regional election will also gain access to state resources at regional level and will suddenly become an attractive partner for the business elite and other role players who would want to gain that party’s favour to get access to tenders and other economic opportunities. This will weaken the absolute dominance of the party that governs nationally and will open up opportunities for further regional gains for smaller parties in other regions (or in our case, Provinces).

Whether the DA is well placed to use its electoral dominance in the Western Cape in this way is an open question. Unless it can transform itself in quite fundamental ways the electorate in other Provinces might not flock to it under any circumstances. But as long as the DA controls the Western Cape, it poses at least a potential threat to the continued national electoral dominance of the ANC, so it would make sense for the ANC to neutralise this threat by changing the boundaries of the Western Cape to rob the DA of its majority.

Such a shameless power play by the ANC (if it were to happen) will, however, not be without its dangers. Where the dominant party acts in ways that robs it of its legitimacy in the eyes of the voters — for example, by demonstrating what appears to be a shameless hunger to cling to power at any cost — this may drive its traditional voters into the arms of the opposition as these voters may value their democracy (and their sense of having a real right to choose their leaders) just as much (or more) than they value their emotional bond with the dominant party. It may also lead to a re-alignment of the political landscape as disillusioned democrats within the dominant party may reject such a naked power grab and may then break from the dominant party.

No wonder the ANC is treading carefully and is suggesting that key political parties (which one assumes would include the DA) should be allowed a space to play its role in the re-shaping of provinces. If it is indeed its intention to rob the DA of its governance role in the Western Cape (something that is not explicitly stated in the discussion document), it may well lose credibility and legitimacy among some of its core voters — especially if it changes section 74(8) of the Constitution.

Mixed signals on the review of our courts

The government yesterday sent mixed signals about its previously announced intention to “review” the decisions of the Constitutional Court when it released a “discussion document” which (laudably) affirmed its respect for the independence of the judiciary and the notion of the separation of powers, but (worryingly) seemed to question the wisdom of retaining a distinctly adversarial system of judicial review.

This antagonism towards an adversarial kind of judicial review seems to be focused primarily on cases where the courts were not enforcing social and economic rights and where the judicial review of government action would signal a failure on the part of the judiciary to “co-operate” with the other arms of government in pursuit of (unnamed) constitutional values or goals.

Speaking at a media briefing yesterday, Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe announced the release of a discussion document on the transformation of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in a developmental state (Pdf document) to frame a “national dialogue” on this programme of “further transformation”. These documents are conceptually incoherent and its authors seem to be confused, as it tries to marry a consensual model of separation of powers with a model that retains (some form of) judicial review for an independent judiciary. One cannot have both a consensual model of separation of powers and an independent judiciary that acts as a true check on the exercise of power by the other branches of government. Suggesting that one can, is at best misinformed and at worst misleading.

This conceptual confusion probably flows from the fact that the government of the day is retreating slightly from its position taken in November last year about the need for a serious review of Constitutional Court decisions. This retreat might have been caused by the public outcry about the perceived intention of the government to interfere with the powers of the courts to review and set aside acts by the other branches of government.

It might also be animated by the sinking realisation that both the proposed review of the Constitutional Court and any possible amendments to its powers will be impossible to implement. After all, who will actually be able to peruse all the documents before the Constitutional Court in every single case ever heard by that court to make a sensible assessment of its performance? And in the absence of such a wide ranging perusal of all relevant documents, any review of the Court will be nonsensical and meaningless as it will not tell us anything about whether the court fulfilled its mandate (or whether it was, for example, hampered in its task by the tardiness of the lawyers who appeared before it or the dismal quality of the papers before it).

The discussion document talks about a need for “further transformation of the judicial system”, but fails to indicate what such further transformation would be aimed at or how it might look. The review clearly does not relate to the current package of constitutional amendments and laws before Parliament aimed at streamlining the courts and enhancing the powers of the Chief Justice. This is because the Minister stated that the current reforms will be finalised before the review is actually concluded. It is therefore unclear what “further transformation” (over and above the current package of amendments and Bills) is envisaged by the government. However, answering questions at the media briefing yesterday Minister Radebe refused to rule out further amendments to the Constitution, suggesting that the government is keeping its options open and that the outcome of this review will depend on which faction in the cabinet gets the upper hand.

In the discussion document and in the speech delivered by the Minister at the media briefing, the government re-affirmed the longstanding commitment of the ANC towards the respect for human rights. The Minister also stated that the envisaged further transformation of the judiciary is underpinned by the separation of powers and an independent judiciary.

Arguing that the values contained in the Constitution – including that of an independent judiciary and the rule of law (but significantly not including the supremacy of the Constitution and judicial review) – are also the values that the ANC has consistently stood and fought for, the Minister stated that the ANC-led government would defend these values at all cost. The Minister recognised that the judiciary had an important role to play in transforming the state and society and in safeguarding and protecting the Constitution and its values through its “constitutionally entrenched judicial authority”.

However, it is not as clear from the Minister’s speech as it should be that the ANC-led government’s continued commitment to the separation of powers and an independent judiciary includes a continued commitment to the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution and the powers of the courts to review and declare invalid not only those provisions of legislation which are in conflict with the Constitution, but also those actions by the executive which infringe on human rights, are not authorised by law or fail to comply with the requirements of rationality and non-arbitrariness which are inherent in a system based on respect for the Rule of Law.

In fact, it is clear that the government is at best uneasy with the notion of an independent Constitutional Court that acts as a vigorous but necessary check on the other branches of government. It would prefer a court that works with government to achieve a common goal – rather than a court that vigorously and in an “activist” manner checks the powers of the other two branches of government and embarrasses the legislature and especially the executive by sometimes declaring some of their actions unconstitutional and invalid.

Judges, suggested Minister Radebe, must exercise their power of judicial review “with great circumspection”. The three branches of the state, claimed Minister Radebe, “are co-equal partners entrusted with distinct constitutional powers in their quest to realise the ideals of a democratic South Africa”. Whether this would mean that one branch – the judiciary – would retain the necessary power to trump the other branches when those branches failed to act in compliance with the Constitution or ordinary law (and hence would retain the power to declare invalid unconstitutional laws and unlawful and unconstitutional acts by the President and other members of the executive), is not as clear from this statement as it should have been.

To be fair, the discussion document affirms that the modern concept of constitutionalism rests on two main pillars:

First, the existence of certain limitations imposed on the state, particularly in its relations with citizens, based on certain clearly defined sets of core values. Secondly, the existence of a clearly defined mechanism for ensuring that limitations on the government are legally enforceable. In this broad sense, constitutionalism has a certain core, irreducible and possible minimum content of values with a well-defined process and procedural mechanisms to hold government accountable.

As the discussion further notes, there are some debate about the degree to which judges should be empowered to “interfere” with the decisions of the other branches of government:

Striking a balance between policy and law becomes necessary in the current times where courts are increasingly placed in a situation where they have to pronounce on matters of public policy. The interface between the courts’ power of judicial review and the policy terrain that is the purview of the Executive and the Legislature becomes even more delicate in the South African situation where the Constitution enshrines a justiciable Bill of Rights. It is in this context, in particular in the interpretation of the socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights, that judicial power should, by necessity, be vested in a mechanism independent of the legislative and executive powers of the government, with adequate guarantees to insulate it from political and other influences.

The government seems to have realised that – as a matter of practical politics and constitutional design – it will not be possible at present to address its unhappiness with the courts who strike this balance differently than the government would have wanted them to, as the government will not be able to reduce the powers of the courts to review and set aside unconstitutional or other unlawful acts by the legislature and the executive.

Instead, there are passages in the document which suggest that the government is hoping that it will be able to water down the independence of the judiciary by creating mechanisms that will help to break down the strict separation between the judiciary on the one hand and the other two branches of government on the other. The conceptual incoherence comes to the fore in these passages which, quite frankly, I find rather frightening. This is because the passages suggests a fundamental lack of understanding and/or respect for the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances in a constitutional democracy. The document thus makes the following extraordinary claim:

The importance of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state to cooperate and act interdependently in exercising their distinctive constitutional obligations for the common good of the country cannot be over-emphasised. Government must function as an integrated, singular unit in pursuit of the vision set out in the Constitution. Formidable state machinery, acting in unison, is a requisite to overcome the colonial and apartheid legacy of inequality, and the deprivation of the majority of our people. The principle of separation of powers envisages a system of mutual co-existence and interdependence by all three branches of the state.

Of course, if the three branches were to act in complete unison as an integrated singular unit “for the common good” (a common good defined by those politicians who happen to be in power), it would be difficult to see how one branch of that government would consistently declare invalid the acts of the other branches of the government with which it works in unison. At best the branches will debate the constitutional issues at stake beforehand and the two political branches will alter course to ensure compliance with the Constitution. At worst the two political branches will be able to prevail politically on the judiciary to re-interpret the provisions of the Constitution to give the legislature and executive more leeway to do as they please.

This vision of the three branches all working as an integrated whole towards a common goal (defined by the political party in government) therefore seems to be at odds with a modern notion of a separation of powers in a constitutional state in which the courts retain the power vigorously to check the power of the other two branches of government. The document quotes from a chapter in a Canadian Law Commission Report entitled “Interdependence not independence: Institutional and administrative dimensions of judicial independence”, written by Richard Simeon to support its view. Simeon argues for the need for interdependence and the collegiality of effort for the effective coordination and consolidation of programmes of the state towards a common vision. With reference to the American Constitution (but not in line with the South African jurisprudence) Simeon makes the claim that no clear lines can be drawn between the branches of government:

The doctrine of separation of powers is often invoked to justify the institutional independence of the Judiciary. But sometimes forgotten is the other core of the principle of the US Constitution, checks and balances. The American constitutional design does not envision the three branches as existing in splendid isolation from each other. Rather, tyranny is avoided by having each branch check and balance each other – in other words to be interdependent. The relationship among them is indeed ‘indelibly political’. A blend, as a US judge puts it, of ‘separateness, but interdependence, autonomy, but reciprocity’. At any time there is a dialogue, or negotiation with the other branches about… budget, jurisdiction, size, procedures, and administration.

What the document fails to say is that the chapter from which it quotes was written by a political scientists (and not a judge or a lawyer) and that the author introduced his remarks by saying that he was talking as someone concerned with public administration, a person who believed that the constitution was not of much help in any discussion about the relationship between the branches of government. It also does not mention that this view flies in the face of the view taken by the Canadian Supreme Court (which is indeed staffed by real judges, not political scientists) in the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.) judgement, a case in which that court made the following statement directly at odds with the views expressed by the discussion document:

under no circumstances is it permissible for the judiciary — not only collectively through representative organizations, but also as individuals — to engage in negotiations over remuneration with the executive or representatives of the legislature. Any such negotiations would be fundamentally at odds with judicial independence. … The prohibition on negotiations therefore does not preclude expressions of concern or representations by chief justices and chief judges, and organizations that represent judges, to governments regarding the adequacy of judicial remuneration….

What is at issue here is the character of the relationships between the legislature and the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. These relationships should be depoliticized. When I say that those relationships are depoliticized, I do not mean to deny that they are political in the sense that court decisions (both constitutional and non-constitutional) often have political implications, and that the statutes which courts adjudicate upon emerge from the political process. What I mean instead is the legislature and executive cannot, and cannot appear to, exert political pressure on the judiciary, and conversely, that members of the judiciary should exercise reserve in speaking out publicly on issues of general public policy that are or have the potential to come before the courts, that are the subject of political debate, and which do not relate to the proper administration of justice.

In the light of the above the proposal in the document regarding the closer co-operation between branches and the need for the branches to engage with one another in order to co-ordinate its activities so that it can operate as a single unit, is deeply troubling. The following proposal is therefore a non-starter and any judge – including the Chief Justice – who values judicial independence should reject it out of hand. The document namely proposes that one aim of any review would be to facilitate:

the establishment of mechanisms for the three branches of state to engage in regular debates to manage their interface within the context of the separation of powers in pursuit of a common transformative goal that is geared to benefit society at large.

Of course these proposals are not only conceptually incoherent, and in conflict with the understanding given to the separation of powers by judges and lawyers in other modern democracies, they are also doubly problematic in a country like South Africa with a one party dominant democracy in which the legislature and the executive (as well as the institution tasked with appointing judges) are dominated by one political party and where there is little chance that another party will take control of these branches of government or of the JSC in the medium to long term. In a one party dominant democracy, a proposal for the creation of mechanisms to allow for “debates” between the three branches of government, is a proposal to infuse party political concerns into the relationship between the three branches of government.

While the decisions of judges cannot be divorced from politics and while many judicial decisions will have political consequences, the infusion of party politics in the relationship between the legislature and executive on the one hand and the judiciary on the other will render a fatal blow to the principles of respect for the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as it will lead to an inevitable exertion of political pressure on the judiciary – as the Canadian Supreme Court warned so clearly.

The question that arises from this discussion document is the following: will the leadership of the judiciary go along with the proposals to infuse party politics into the relationship between the three branches of government or will they resist and fight for their independence and for their constitutionally conferred power to check the other two branches of government?

Why the Traditional Courts Bill might be unconstitutional

The Law, Race and Gender unit at UCT has produced the following video explaining why aspects of the Traditional Courts Bill tabled last month may be unconstitutional.

On accountability, transparency and the “bribing” of journalists

It is a rather inconvenient fact (inconvenient for some people, at least) that the notion of an open, transparent and accountable government runs like a golden thread throughout our Constitution. Rejecting the secretive and often lawless bureaucratic managarialism of the apartheid era, in which citizens were more often than not treated as disembodied entities to be ordered around, controlled and sometimes dispensed with (and not as human beings with an inherent human dignity), the Constitution – also in this regard – demands a fundamental break with our apartheid past.

Thus section 1 of the South African Constitution states that the Republic of South Africa is founded on the values, inter alia, of “[u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”.

These founding values are amplified in several sections of the Constitution to help create governance institutions that are truly open and transparent, that share information about their work, serve people, listen and respond to the concerns of voters, and do not shy away from scrutiny but invite it in order to improve the way in which they serve the public.

Thus section 55(2) of the Constitution states that the National Assembly must provide for mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it and to maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority, including the implementation of legislation; and any organ of state. Section 56 also states rather boldly that the National Assembly or any of its committees may summon any person (including any Minister or the President) to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce documents and may require any person or institution to report to it. When ministers claim that they have better things to do than account to Parliament or that information cannot be provided to Parliament for “national security” reasons, they are flouting the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.

Section 96(3) confirms this obligation to account by stating that ministers “are accountable individually to the President and to the National Assembly for the administration of their portfolios, and all members of the Cabinet are correspondingly accountable collectively for the performance of the functions of the national government and for its policies”. Section 195 of the Constitution extends these obligations to civil servants by stating that Public Administration must be accountable and that transparency must be fostered in the public service by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.

To beef up this system of openness and accountability, section 32 of the Bill of Rights guarantees for everyone “the right of access to any information held by the state; and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights”.

It is against this background that one should evaluate the legal wrangling between Independent Newspapers and the ANC regarding the so called “brown envelope scandal” report prepared by the now Deputy Minister of Justice. Recall that the scandal centres around the alleged attempts by former Premier Embrahim Rasool (now safely “deployed” as South Africa’s ambassador to the USA), to bribe journalists in order to get their co-operation in smearing his political enemies inside the ANC and to provide positive news coverage for his ANC-led administration in the Western Cape.

This saga should really give some ammunition to those ANC and SACP leaders who complain that members of the media, civil society groups and other powerful role players are not required to adhere to the same standards of openness and transparency and are not subject to the same forms of accountability as members of the government is. Who guards the guardians, they ask. But curiously, this scandal has not been mentioned at all when these kinds of arguments have been put forward.

(Of course, in extreme cases, the argument is put forward that the constitutionally imposed rules should not be applied to politicians at all because others are not held to the same rules. Like school children caught smoking behind the bicycle shed they say the equivalent of: “But the teachers also smoke.” As such an argument defies logic, I will leave it aside for the moment.)

Nevertheless, this saga does raise serious questions about the ways in which politicians or other powerful and rich individuals or groups could pervert the democratic process by bribing journalists, columnists or other opinion-makers.

Last week judge Bennie Griesel released an internal ANC report (after having a so called “judicial peep at it in terms of section 80 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)) along with a short judgment giving reasons for this. It is very surprising, to say the least, that Griesel J released the report, despite the fact that the ANC might have wanted to appeal his judgment.

It is true that section 82 of PAIA states that the court hearing an application for access to information may grant any order that is just and equitable including orders confirming, amending or setting aside the decision which is the subject of the application. However, section 80(2) of PAIA states that when taking a “judicial peek” a judge may not disclose to any person “including the parties to the proceedings concerned” the contents of the document he or she had a “judicial peek” at.

As I understand these provisions of PAIA, what should have happened is that the learned judge should have ordered the ANC to hand over the report to Independent Newspapers and the ANC would then have had the opportunity to decide whether it wished to appeal the decision or whether it would hand over the report as ordered.

In my opinion the judge committed a serious blunder and the ANC had every reason to complain – on legal grounds – about the premature release of the report. The problem is that the blunder cannot be corrected as the report now forms part of the judgment and can be read by anyone.

However, two further questions arise from this saga. First, the “interim report” noted that the facts uncovered by the investigators raised serious questions about possible impropriety which had to be investigated further. The investigators could not determine the exact nature of the relationship between the Premier and his government on the one hand and the journalists and the company they were involved in on the other hand.

These questions were apparently never further investigated, despite the recommendations of the investigators that it should. The question is: why not? Given the concern expressed by some ANC leaders about the alleged unaccountability of journalists and about the corruption of journalists by money or political interests, it is curious that the party never bothered to find out whether its own Premier had bribed at least two journalists.

Surely, if the ANC was truly concerned about the lack of openness and accountability of the media and if it was prepared to act on its principles, it would have completed this investigation and would have taken firm action against Rasool if it had found that he had indeed bribed some journalists and would have handed the matter over to the police for possible criminal prosecution of the journalists (and of Rasool).

Does this mean the purported concerns expressed about the unaccountability of journalists and civil society leaders only relate to a concern about journalists not reporting favourably on the ANC or concern about civil society leaders who expose ANC government corruption or maladministration? And why was the ANC so desperate to keep this report secret? Surely, if the party was really respectful of the rights of citizens to have access to information, it should have volunteered to make this report public? Somehow it never did and would, so it now says, have even spent even more money to appeal the Griesel judgment had the judge not blundered and made the report public. Why all this secrecy if the party had nothing to hide?

The second, far more complex, question is whether journalists are indeed sufficiently transparent and accountable. How do we know that journalists report honestly and fairly about issues and how do we know that they have not been corrupted by both public and private money and power? When a journalist or columnist say nice things about a political leader, is this because the journalist or columnist was given some shares in a company or given a bribe? If a reporter claims that a new model car is the best in its class, is this perhaps because the vehicle manufacturer has showered the journalists with freebies?

Clearly, journalists and columnists are not in exactly the same position as politicians. Politicians are elected, journalists and columnists are not. Politicians make decisions about how our money should be taxed and how the taxes should be spent, journalists and columnists do not. Politicians can ride the gravy train, journalists cannot. Some politicians have enormous power: they can give instructions to the police to shoot and kill people, they can order the invasion of Lesotho (and how did that one work out for you honourable Mangosutho Buthelezi?), they can legally instruct spies to spread lies about perceived enemies of the state. Journalists and columnists can do none of these things.

The argument that journalists, columnists and civil society leaders should therefore be held accountable in exactly the same way as politicians can therefore not be sustained. Claiming that they exercise more power than the President who can make life and death decisions about our future is, quite frankly, absurd and also obviously self-serving.

Yet, as the brown envelope saga demonstrates, journalists, columnists and civil society leaders do potentially wield considerable power, their words and deeds influence public perceptions and can influence how the electorate vote. And we know that they can all be corrupted. Should we really trust that the “market” will hold them accountable (yeah right!) or that internal ethics rules will ensure that they are never corrupted by those in the public and private sector with the most money and or power?

And if we do not trust them to regulate themselves, how do we ensure some transparency and accountability on the part of journalists, columnists and civil society leaders, without endorsing a system of political control by the very politicians from whom we all need serious protection?