The fact that the banks do the same thing might show that it is not simply that the DA is evil but that they are doing that which is commonplace in the private sector.

As regards the further content of your latest post, I don’t think we disagree about anything. That is, we agree that there is something of a case to be made out as to the Professor’s stance. But it is all circumstantial as you say. And further, no party in a priveleged position has called into question the assessment made in the article. And I agree that this makes for an element of doubt.

Thank you for your usual brand of careful and considered argument in regard to my post. I do so enjoy your posts on this site as you seldom become embroiled in the more “emotional” responses and always reply based on logic and reasoning.

While I cannot disagree with your assessment and the linking of probabilities to form a cohesive argument, my initial post merely reflected the one-sided nature of this discourse. At no stage do either the authors of the quoted article, nor the Professor, offer the City’s response to these allegations. There is no reference whatsoever in the article to any attempt made by the authors to address the issue with City. The entire article is premised on circumstantial (albeit strong) evidence that supports their supposition.

I will certainly concede that the likelihood of the link between the action by the firm and the letter from the City appears to be connected. However, this has not, as yet been verified by any of the parties concerned.

I think that the extract to which the Professor refers indicates a powerful likelihood of a clear connection between the city’s election to terminate the mandate on the one hand, and Smith Tabata’s representaion of the shack dwellers on the other.

I think you are right insofar as some of the view that there exists a connection is premised on assumption. But as I am sure you well know, when it comes to proving things, lawyers are accustomed to dealing with probabilities. And I think, with respect, that the probabilities with which we are confronted heavily favour the Professor’s view. And I base my opinion on two factors.

For a start, the passage in question reflects the following content: after mentioning that it had become aware of the firms litigation against the city, the city said it is ‘ therefore terminating its mandate with your firm’. Now this fact, of itself, denotes a causal linkage between some conduct by the firm on the one hand, and the termination of the mandate on the other.

The second factor favouring the Professor’s view is the time frame involved here. The hyperlink reflected in the Professor’s piece indicates that the shack dwellers launched their application in May 2009. We also know that they pursued the claim on an urgent basis. That indicates that very little time would have passed between the firm accepting the instruction and the bringing of the claim. Now the extract in question indicates that the mandate was terminated on 18 June 2009. So we are speaking of a few weeks between suit and termination.

So with respect, the Professor’s view that there was a causal relation between representation and termination seems very tenable. So much so that in the absence of any contrary material, I would accept the Professor’s view on the probablities.

Clearly, a fudiciary, agent etc can not represent opposing parties in the same issue. Whose interest will the agent serve? However, the agent can and often is allowed by law to represent both parties on matters that are unrelated. Now it is important to know if the law firm represented the City and the People in the same dispute.

What the City did is no different to what SA banks do. Major law firms are at the mercy of the banks. So banks do will remove them from their panels should the law firm represent an opposing party to a bank even on unrelated matter. The law firms have learned to know where their bread is buttered.

Whilst the banks act this way as clients of law firms, it is interesting to see how the banks reverse their act towards their clients.

Banks worldover have, through being oligopolies, managed to put themselves in positions of conflict of interest at times to the difficult to prove detriment of clients and easy to prove benefit of banks. The banks can even contract out of their fiduciary duties. The courts both in England and Australia now recognise the exclusion of fiduciary duties and conflicts of interest by banks so long as banks have chinese walls (which are a searve) as means to manage such conflicts.

So ultimately, justice is for those with the money. So if law firms know that their business depends on the State and banks, rest assured the law firms will continue to act in their business interest. That is the real world.

Thank you for the compliment and the offer extended.

Unfortunately, I am not an attorney so cannot assist you with your appeal. I’m afraid I’m still merely a student (albeit a rather mature one) and still have some way to go before I complete my LLB!!

Perhaps someone else on this site can take you up on your offer. Good luck with it!!

Apparently a BIG section of the SA-law-industry has got the wrong
idea of what it’s about.
————————-
I’m hoping to get an answer to this over-arching question:
IF there was a rule against law industry entities simultaneously
representing FOR and AGAINST a party — conflict of interest,
AND
an acceptance that local authorities [democratically & transparently]
represent the interest of their [paying] residents,
would it be accepted [in a high enough Court. which doesn't just
act like a dumb rule-clerk] that since the ‘conflict of interest principle’
does not apply to a L.A. , the ‘rule’ does not apply ?
And in general, to what level of Court [if any] must litigation rise
[in SA} for the PURPOSE of a rule/principle to determine its applicability ?

== TIA.