Quote of the week

Although judicial proceedings will generally be bound by the requirements of natural justice to a greater degree than will hearings before administrative tribunals, judicial decision-makers, by virtue of their positions, have nonetheless been granted considerable deference by appellate courts inquiring into the apprehension of bias. This is because judges ‘are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances’: The presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, for as Blackstone opined at p. 361 in Commentaries on the Laws of England III . . . ‘[t]he law will not suppose possibility of bias in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea’. Thus, reviewing courts have been hesitant to make a finding of bias or to perceive a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a judge, in the absence of convincing evidence to that effect.

L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
28 September 2012

Malema’s rights to freedom of movement and assembly have undoubtedly been infringed. The decision to charge him a week before the opening of ANC leadership nominations does not merely look like an example of selective prosecution, it appears to be a celebration of it. It seems to be a deliberate and shocking demonstration of the capacity of Zuma’s faction to institute — and also to suspend — police investigations and criminal prosecutions. Moyo’s conclusion is that there is “clearly more than enough on the horizon to warrant putting South Africa on a Sadc security watch list — without ruling out (later) placing the beleaguered country on the agenda of the (Sadc) Organ Troika”. – Anthony Butler in Business Day

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