Quote of the week

Although judicial proceedings will generally be bound by the requirements of natural justice to a greater degree than will hearings before administrative tribunals, judicial decision-makers, by virtue of their positions, have nonetheless been granted considerable deference by appellate courts inquiring into the apprehension of bias. This is because judges ‘are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances’: The presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, for as Blackstone opined at p. 361 in Commentaries on the Laws of England III . . . ‘[t]he law will not suppose possibility of bias in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea’. Thus, reviewing courts have been hesitant to make a finding of bias or to perceive a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a judge, in the absence of convincing evidence to that effect.

L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
18 September 2015

Harvard Workshop on Animals in Comparative Constitutional Law

Harvard Workshop on Animals in Comparative Constitutional Law

Harvard Law School is seeking submissions for a workshop on Animals in Comparative Constitutional Law to be held on Thursday, February 18, 2016.

We invite scholarly submissions on any theme relevant to this topic, including pieces addressing constitutional theory, institutional design, and case studies grounded in the constitutional experiences of particular jurisdictions or regions.  We are also interested in topics that involve issues of religious law, such as the relevance of the halal and kosher debates to constitutional developments regarding animals (e.g. in Europe), and the religious dimensions of the constitutional protections for animals (e.g. in India).

Applicants should submit an abstract (between 500 and 1,000 words) to cgreen@law.harvard.edu, along with a C.V., by October 15, 2015.  All submissions must be in English.  Decisions on workshop participation will be communicated to applicants by October 29, 2015.

All selected participants will be expected to produce a working draft of their paper (approximately 10,000 words) by December 15, 2015, and to participate in person at our workshop, to be held at Harvard Law School, on Thursday, February 18, 2016.

Harvard Law School will cover the travel costs and local accommodations of participants.  The workshop is sponsored by the Animal Law & Policy Program and the Islamic Legal Studies Program.

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