Quote of the week

Mr Zuma is no ordinary litigant. He is the former President of the Republic, who remains a public figure and continues to wield significant political influence, while acting as an example to his supporters… He has a great deal of power to incite others to similarly defy court orders because his actions and any consequences, or lack thereof, are being closely observed by the public. If his conduct is met with impunity, he will do significant damage to the rule of law. As this Court noted in Mamabolo, “[n]o one familiar with our history can be unaware of the very special need to preserve the integrity of the rule of law”. Mr Zuma is subject to the laws of the Republic. No person enjoys exclusion or exemption from the sovereignty of our laws… It would be antithetical to the value of accountability if those who once held high office are not bound by the law.

Khampepe j
Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v Zuma and Others (CCT 52/21) [2021] ZACC 18
14 July 2007

On judicial deference

A reader seems perturbed by a column in last week’s Mail & Guardian commenting on the ANC discussion documents on the transformation of the judiciary. In it, the anonymous columnist focuses on the document’s obsession with the principle of the separation of powers and asks why this is happening.

One answer is to be found in the document’s recommendations: there is a desire to guarantee a judiciary that will be as cooperative with the government as possible, nd that will produce a body of law as deferential as is constitutionally permissible.

The reader suggests this is a disturbing possibility and comments: “The word ‘objective’ would be much more comforting. There is a degree of submission associated with the word ‘deference’.”

This is a fascinating question. In the pre-democratic South African legal discourse, “deference” was used as byword to describe what judges did who uncritically applied the apartheid legislation and generally did not ask any questions.

Some more traditional commentators still use “deference” as the measure to decide how independent and progressive the members of, say, the Constitutional Court really are and often argue that they are too deferential and to eager to agree with the ANC government.

Some judges of the Constitutional Court – most notably now retired Richard Goldstone – told me that the new Constitutional Court judges were acutely aware that unlike the new Parliament, it had not been democratically elected. The judges therefore had a duty not to act as a force unto itself, but had to show respect for the other branches of government.

But respect does not mean always agreeing with the legislature or the executive. The Constitutional Court has declared invalid numerous legal provisions and numerous decisions taken by Ministers and the President. They are deferent in style, but not deferent in the orders they make.

Of course the Mail & Guardian columnist suggests that the ANC wants a Court that always agrees with it and never criticises it. If that is indeed, the impulse behind the document it is troubling. Judges are the guardians of the Constitution and must act as referees to interpret the rules of the game and to ensure that the other players (legislature and executive) stick to the rules as interpreted.

If they merely become a rubber stamp of the President, say, we have come to the end of a true constitutional state. Of course most governments want courts to agree with them and try to influence them in that regard. So far the judges of South Africa’s Constitutional Court has shown a remarkable independence and although we criticise some of their judgments as reactionary or unimaginative that they been, on balance, quite wise in striking the balance between judicial activism and showing the appropriate deference.

In doing so, they have not acted “objectively” because, I believe that is not possible. Every judge brings his or her own view to the table and has to interpret extraordinary broad and vague provisions such as “Everyone has a right to human dignity”, which is impossible to do in an “objective” manner.

What is required is to act in a more or less principled manner and not on a whim because it is thus that the Court earns respect and enhances its legitimacy, which after all, is all the Court has to defend itself against the might of the other two branches of government.
SHARE:     
BACK TO TOP
2015 Constitutionally Speaking | website created by Idea in a Forest