Quote of the week

Although judicial proceedings will generally be bound by the requirements of natural justice to a greater degree than will hearings before administrative tribunals, judicial decision-makers, by virtue of their positions, have nonetheless been granted considerable deference by appellate courts inquiring into the apprehension of bias. This is because judges ‘are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances’: The presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, for as Blackstone opined at p. 361 in Commentaries on the Laws of England III . . . ‘[t]he law will not suppose possibility of bias in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea’. Thus, reviewing courts have been hesitant to make a finding of bias or to perceive a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a judge, in the absence of convincing evidence to that effect.

L'Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288
22 October 2018

On rape survivors

Our judicial processes should not allow further victimisation to occur in the courtroom. Victims of sexual and gender-based violence are often faced with multiple levels of stigma and prejudice at a family and community level. These are further entrenched in police processes and courtroom battles. Those victims who are brave enough to overcome all the doubt and fear to report their cases, face further victimisation by the police. Police officers are generally perceived as being indifferent to the plight of women who are victims of sexual and gender-based violence. These men (and women) are usually the first figures victims encounter in the judicial system, yet many victims relate how unsavoury these encounters were for them.

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